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Bern Course

 

 

Political Economy of Globalization:

The Endogenous Policy Approach

Dates: 07 August – 11 August 2017

4 ECTS

 

Professor: Douglas Nelson

email: dnelson@tulane.edu

Webpage: http://nelson.wp.tulane.edu/

 

Current events suggest that the politics of globalization have become an issue of first-rate importance. The goal of this course is to develop a robust set of theoretical and econometric tools for analysing the political economy of globalization. In particular, we develop an approach generally called endogenous policy modeling–an extension of general equilibrium theory to incorporate politics. As our leading example, we will focus on trade and migration policy, but the application of this approach is as broad as the application of general equilibrium theory to policy analysis in general. The course is intended to provide students with an overview of research in this area and to provide them with the tools to carry out research on the links between trade/migration, politics and policy-making.

 

Grading

         Class participation (10%); research paper (90%).

Everyone must prepare a piece of original research on the topic of the seminar. The paper need not focus on one of the lecture topics, but it must be related to political economy of globalization. To ensure that there is no confusion, I require a paper proposal submitted to me no later than the day of the last lecture. The papers are due 6 (six) weeks after the completion of the lectures.

 

Organization

 Lectures: Total Nr. of hours: 25.

 Schedule: The course takes place from Monday 07-08 until Friday 11-08. Class hours are 9.30am-12am (noon), 1.30pm-4pm. This is an intensive course. Please try to do (some) readings already before the course-week starts.

 Place: Room ‘Silva Casa’. World Trade Institute, University Bern. Hallerstrasse 6. 3012-Bern.

 Readings: The syllabus of readings that follows contains live links that will allow you to easily access readings. In the syllabus, some reading are market with a “■”, I consider these to be essential readings; while others are marked with a “○”, I consider these to be important enough to be on the syllabus (and you should read them if you plan to make political economy an essential part of your future research), but not essential.

 

Instructor

 Prof. Douglas Nelson is Professor of Economics in the Murphy Institute at Tulane University.

 

 

SYLLABUS

 

Topic I. Introduction to Political Economic Analysis

Topic II. Identifying Citizen Preferences

 ● Background: Factor Market Effects of Trade

○ Nelson notes: Stolper-Samuelson theorem [Generalizations optional]

Jones (1965). “The Structure of Simple General Equilibrium Models”. Journal of Political Economy; V.73-#6, pp. 557-572.

Jones and Scheinkman (1977). “The Relevance of the Two-Sector Production Model in Trade Theory”. Journal of Political Economy; V.85-#5, pp. 909-935.

Cassing (1981). “On the Relationship between Commodity Price Changes and Factor-Owners Real Positions”. Journal of Political Economy; V.89-#3, pp. 593-595.

Jones (1985). “Relative Prices and Real Factor Rewards: A Reinterpretation”. Economics Letters; V.19-#1, pp. 47-49.

Lloyd and Schweinberger (1997). “Conflict Generating Product Price Changes: The Imputed Output Approach”. European Economic Review; V.41-#8, pp. 1569-1587.

Lloyd (2000). “Generalizing the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem: A Tale of Two Matrices”. Review of International Economics; V.8-#4, pp. 597-613.

 

● Deriving Policy Preferences

■ Nelson notes: Deriving trade policy preferences

Jones (1992). “Factor Scarcity, Factor Abundance and Attitudes Towards Protection: The 3×3 Model.” Journal of International Economic Integration, V.7-#1, 1-19.

Tokarick (1995). “Friends, Enemies and Factor Diversification: Implications for Protectionist Pressure”. Journal of Economic Integration; V.10-#4, pp. 434-443.

Bilal, Grether and de Melo (2003). “Attitudes Towards Immigration: A Trade-Theoretic Approach.” Review of International Economics, V.11-#2, 253-67.

 

● Survey Data: Trade

Scheve and Slaughter (2001). “What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences?Journal of International Economics, V.54-#2, 267-92.

Mayda and Rodrik (2005). “Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist Than Others?European Economic Review, V.49-#6, 1393-430.

Hainmueller and Hiscox (2006). “Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes toward International Trade.” International Organization, V.60-#2, 469-98.

Hiscox (2006). “Through a Glass Darkly: Framing Effects and Individuals’ Attitudes toward Trade.” International Organization, V.60-#3, 755-80.

○ Guisinger (2009). “Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable?International Organization, V.63-#3, 533-57.

○ Mansfield and Mutz (2009). “Support for Free Trade: Self-interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety.” International Organization, V.63-#3, 425-57.

○ Mansfield and Mutz (2013). “US Versus Them: Mass Attitudes toward Offshore Outsourcing.” World Politics, V.65-#04, 571-608.

○ Blonigen and McGrew (2014). “Task Routineness and Trade Policy Preferences.” Economics & Politics, V.26-#3, 505-18.

○ Owen and Johnston (forth). “Occupation and the Political Economy of Trade: Job Routineness, Offshorability and Protectionist Sentiment.” International Organization.

○ Jäkel and Smolka (2017). “Trade Policy Preferences and Factor Abundance.” Journal of International Economics, V.106, 1-19.

○ Rho and Tomz (forth). “Why Don’t Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self Interest?”. International Organization.

○ Hall and Nelson (2004). “The Peculiar Political Economy of NAFTA: Complexity, Uncertainty and Footloose Policy Preferences”. in Mitra and Panagariya, eds. The Political Economy of Trade, Aid and Foreign Investment Policies. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 159-175.

 

● Survey Data: Migration

■ Scheve and Slaughter (2001). “Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences over Migration Policy.” Review of Economics and Statistics, V.83-#1, 133-45.

Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010). “Attitudes toward Highly Skilled and Low Skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment.” American Political Science Review, V.104-#1, 61-84.

Card, Dustmann and Preston (2012). “Immigration, Wages, and Compositional Ameneties.” Journal of the European Economic Association, V.10-#1, 78-119.

○ Dustmann, Christian; Francesca Fabbri and Ian Preston (2011). “Racial Harassment, Ethnic Concentration, and Economic Conditions.” The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, V.113-#3, 689-711

○ Brader, Valentino and Suhay (2008). “What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat.” American Journal of Political Science, V.52-#4, 959-78.

○ Hopkins (2010). “Politicized Places: Explaining Where and When Immigrants Provoke Local Opposition”. American Political Science Review; 104(1), 40-60.

○ Hopkins. (2011). “National Debates, Local Responses: The Origins of Local Concern About Immigration in Britain and the United States.” British Journal of Political Science, V.41-#03, 499-524.

Malhotra, Margalit and Mo (2013). “Economic Explanations for Opposition to Immigration: Distinguishing between Prevalence and Conditional Impact.” American Journal of Political Science, V.57-#2, 391-410.

○ Hainmueller and Hopkins (2015). “The Hidden American Immigration Consensus: A Conjoint Analysis of Attitudes toward Immigrants.” American Journal of Political Science, V.59-#3, 529-48.

○ Hainmueller, Hiscox and Margalit (2015). “Do Concerns About Labor Market Competition Shape Attitudes toward Immigration? New Evidence.” Journal of International Economics, V.97-#1, 193-207.

Wright, Levy and Citrin (2016). “Public Attitudes toward Immigration Policy across the Legal/Illegal Divide: The Role of Categorical and Attribute-Based Decision-Making.” Political Behavior, V.38-#1, 229-53.

 

Topic III. Referendum

 ● The Basic Referendum Model: Trade

■ Mayer (1984). “Endogenous Tariff Formation”. American Economic Review; V.74-#5, pp. 970-985.

○ Rotemberg (2003). “Commercial Policy with Altruistic Voters”. Journal of Political Economy; V.111-#1, pp. 202-226.

○ Fischer and Serra (1996). “Income Inequality and Choice of Free Trade in a Model of Intraindustry Trade”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.111-#1, pp. 41-64.

○ Das (2001). “Endogenous Distribution and the Political Economy of Trade Policy”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.17-#3, pp. 465-491.

○ McLaren (2004).“Trade Policy Making by an Assembly”. in Mitra and Panagariya, eds. The Political Economy of Trade, Aid and Foreign Investment Policies. Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 11-29.

○ Davidson, Matusz and Nelson (2006). “Fairness and the Political Economy of Trade.” World Economy, V.29-#8, 989-1004.

○ Davidson, Matusz and Nelson (2007). “Can Compensation Save Free Trade?Journal of International Economics, V.71-#1, 167-86.

○ Djerdjian (2009). “Economies of Scale and Trade Policy: The Median Voter Model Revisited.” International Review of Economics and Finance, V.18-#3, 479-87.

○ Vannoorenberghe and Janeba (2016). “Trade and the Political Economy of Redistribution.” Journal of International Economics, V.98, 233-44.

 

● Public Politics, Direct & Indirect Referenda: Trade

■ Margalit (2011). “Costly Jobs: Trade-Related Layoffs, Government Compensation, and Voting in U.S. Elections.” The American Political Science Review, V.105-#1, 166-88.

○ Margalit (2012). “Lost in Globalization: International Economic Integration and the Sources of Popular Discontent.” International Studies Quarterly, V.56-#3, 484-500.

■ Jensen, Quinn and Weymouth (2017). “Winners and Losers in International Trade: The Effects on US Presidential Voting,” International Organization, V.72-#3.

○ Malgouyres, Clément (2014). “Trade Shocks and Far-Right Voting: Evidence from French Presidential Elections,” European University Institute Working Paper.

■ Dutt and Mitra (2002). “Endogenous Trade Policy through Majority Voting: An Empirical Investigation.” Journal of International Economics, V.58-#1, 107-33.

○ Tavares (2008). “Trade, Factor Proportions, and Political Rights.” Review of Economics and Statistics, V.90-#1, 163-68.

○ Dhingra (2014). “Reconciling Observed Tariffs and the Median Voter Model.” Economics & Politics, V.26-#3, 483-504.

○ Weck-Hannemann (1990). “Protectionism in Direct Democracy”. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics; V.146-#3, pp. 389-418.

○ Irwin (1994). “The Political Economy of Free Trade: Voting in the British General Election of 1906”. Journal of Law and Economics; V.37-#1, pp. 75-108.

○ Irwin (1996). “Industry or Class Cleavages over Trade Policy?: Evidence from the British General Election of 1923”. in R. Feenstra, G. Grossman and D. Irwin, eds. The Political Economy of Trade Policy. Cambridge: MIT, pp. 53-75.

Hall, Kao, and Nelson (1998). “Women and Tariffs: Testing Gender Gap in a Downs-Mayer Model”. Economic Inquiry; V.36-#2, pp. 320-332.

 

● Legislative voting on trade

■ Baldwin and Magee (2000). “Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills.” Public Choice, V.105-#1, 79-101.

■ Hiscox (2002). “Commerce, Coalitions, and Factor Mobility: Evidence from Congressional Votes on Trade Legislation.” American Political Science Review, V.96-#3, 593-608.

■ Bohara, Camargo, Grijalva and Gawande (2005). “Fundamental Dimensions in U.S. Trade Policy.” Journal of International Economics, V.65-#1, 93-125.

■ Conconi, Facchini and Zanardi (2014). “Policymakers’ Horizon and Trade Reforms: The Protectionist Effect of Elections.” Journal of International Economics, V.94-#1, 102-18.

○ Owen (Forth). “Exposure to Offshoring and the Politics of Trade Liberalization: Debate and Votes on Free Trade Agreements in the 108th US Congress.” International Studies Quarterly.

○ Bailey, Goldstein and Weingast (1997). “The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade.” World Politics, V.49-#3, 309-38.

○ Bailey and Brady (1998). “Heterogeneity and Representation: The Senate and Free Trade.” American Journal of Political Science, V.42-#2, 524-44.

○ Box-Steffensmeier, Arnold and Christopher (1997). “The Strategic Timing of Position Taking in Congress: A Study of the North American Free Trade Agreement.” The American Political Science Review, V.91-#2, 324-38.

○ Fordham, Benjamin and Timothy McKeown (2003). “Selection and Influence: Interest Groups and Congressional Voting on Trade Policy.” International Organization, V.57-#3, 519-49.

 

● The Basic Referendum Model: Migration

■ Benhabib (1996). “On the political economy of immigration”. European Economic Review 40, 1737-1743.

○ Grether, deMelo, and Muller (2001). “The Political Economy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Model”. In S. Djajic, ed. International Migration: Trends, Policy, Impact. London: Routledge, pp. 42-68.

○ Ortega (2005). “Immigration Quotas and Skill Upgrading.” Journal of Public Economics, V.89-#9–10, 1841-63.

○ Mayer (2010). From individual to social immigration preferences. ms: University of Cincinnati.

○ Russo (2011). “Voting over Selective Immigration Policies with Immigration Aversion.” Economics of Governance, V.12-#4, 325-51.

○ Bougheas and Nelson (2013). “On the Political Economy of High Skilled Migration and International Trade.” European Economic Review, V.63-#0, 206-24.

 

● Public Politics, Direct & Indirect Referenda: Migration

■ Tolbert and Hero (1996). “Race/Ethnicity and Direct Democracy: An Analysis of California’s Illegal Immigration Initiative.” Journal of Politics, V.58-#3, 806-18.

○ MacDonald and Cain (1997). “Nativism, Partisanship and Immigration: An Analysis of Prop. 187,” in M. B. Preston, B. E. Cain and S. Bass eds, Racial and Ethnic Politics in California, V.II. Berkeley: Institute of Governmental Studies Press, 277-304.

○ Campbell, Wong and Citrin (2006). “’Racial Threat’, Partisan Climate, and Direct Democracy: Contextual Effects in Three California Initiatives.” Political Behavior, V.28-#2, 129.

○ Miguet (2008). “Voting About Immigration Policy: What Does the Swiss Experience Tell Us?”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.24-#3, pp. 628-641.

○ Sciarini and Tresch. (2009). “A Two-Level Analysis of the Determinants of Direct Democratic Choices in European, Immigration and Foreign Policy in Switzerland.” European Union Politics, V.10-#4, 456-81.

○ Krishnakumar and Müller (2012). “The Political Economy of Immigration in a Direct Democracy: The Case of Switzerland”. European Economic Review, V.56-#2, pp. 174-89.

■ Otto and Steinhardt (2014). “Immigration and Election Outcomes — Evidence from City Districts in Hamburg.” Regional Science and Urban Economics, V.45, 67-79.

■ Halla, Wagner and Zweimüller (forth). “Immigration and Voting for the Far Right.” Journal of the European Economic Association.

○ Gerdes and Wadensjö (2008). “The Impact of Immigration on Election Outcomes in Danish Municipalities,” IZA Discussion Paper, #3586.

○ McCarty, Poole and Rosenthal (2006). “Immigration, Income and the Voters’ Incentive to Redistribute”. Chapter 4 in Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, pp. 115-38.

○ Mendez and Cutillas (2014). “Has Immigration Affected Spanish Presidential Elections Results?Journal of Population Economics, V.27-#1, 135-71.

○ Barone, D’Ignazio, de Blasio and Naticchioni (2016). “Mr. Rossi, Mr. Hu and Politics. The Role of Immigration in Shaping Natives’ Voting Behavior.” Journal of Public Economics, V.136, 1-13.

 

● Welfare states and political economy

■ Razin, Sadka, and Swagel (2002). “Tax Burden and Migration: A Political-Economy Theory and Evidence”. Journal of Public Economics; V.85-#2, pp. 167-190.

○ Scholten and Thum (1996). “Public Pensions and Immigration Policy in a Democracy”. Public Choice, V.87-#3-4, pp. 347-61.

○ Epstein and Hillman (2003). “Unemployed Immigrants and Voter Sentiment in the Welfare State”. Journal of Public Economics; V.87-#7/8, pp. 1641-1655.

○ Dolmas and Huffman (2004). “On the Political Economy of Immigration and Income Redistribution”. International Economic Review; V.45-#4, pp. 1129-1168.

○ Hansen (2003). “Immigration and Income Redistribution in Welfare States”. European Journal of Political Economy, V.19-#4, pp. 735-46.

○ Gradstein and Schiff (2004). “The Political Economy of Social Exclusion, with Implications for Immigration Policy”. Journal of Population Economics; V.19-#2, pp. 327-344.

○ Mayr (2007). “Immigration and Income Redistribution: A Political Economy Analysis”. Public Choice, V.131-#1-2, pp. 101-16.

○ Ortega (2010). “Immigration, Citizenship, and the Size of Government”. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, V.10-#1, pp. Article 26.

○ Roemer, Lee and Van der Straeten (2007). Racism, Xenophobia, and Distribution: Multi-Issue Politics in Advanced Democracies. New York: Harvard University Press\Russell Sage foundation.

○ Kessler, Lulfesmann and Myers (2002). “Redistribution, Fiscal Competition, and the Politics of Economic Integration”. Review of Economic Studies, V.69-#4, pp. 899-923.

○ Hanson, Scheve and Slaughter (2007). “Public Finance and Individual Preferences over Globalization Strategies.” Economics & Politics, V.19-#1, 1-33.

○ Burgoon, Koster and van Egmond (2012). “Support for Redistribution and the Paradox of Immigration.” Journal of European Social Policy, V.22-#3, 288-304.

○ Burgoon (2014). “Immigration, Integration, and Support for Redistribution in Europe.” World Politics, V.66-#03, 365-405.

 

Topic IV. Lobbying

 ● The Grossman-Helpman Model

○ Bernheim, B. Douglas and Michael Whinston (1986). “Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, V.101-#1, 1-31.

■ Grossman and Helpman (1994). “Protection for Sale.” American Economic Review, V.84-#4, 833-50.

■ Dixit, Grossman and Helpman (1997). “Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making.” Journal of Political Economy, V.105-#4, 752-69.

■ Baldwin and Robert-Nicoud (2007). “Protection for Sale Made Easy”. CEP Discussion Paper, #800.

■ Ethier (2007). “The Theory of Trade Policy and Trade Agreements: A Critique.” European Journal of Political Economy, V.23-#3, 605-23.

○ Mitra (1999). “Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination.” American Economic Review, V.89-#5, 1116-34.

○ Cadot, de Melo and Olarreaga (2004). “Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Poor and Rich Countries.” World Bank Economic Review, V.18-#3, 345-66.

○ Limão and Panagariya (2004). “Anti-Trade Bias in Trade Policy and General Equilibrium.” Contributions in Economic Analysis & Policy, V.3-#1.

○ Chang (2005). “Protection for Sale under Monopolistic Competition.” Journal of International Economics, V.66-#2, 509-26.

○ Freund and Özden (2008). “Trade Policy and Loss Aversion.” American Economic Review, V.98-#4, 1675-91.

○ Tovar (2011). “Lobbying Costs and Trade Policy.” Journal of International Economics, V.83-#2, 126-36.

 

● Empirics of the Grossman-Helpman Model: Trade

■ Goldberg and Maggi (1999). “Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation.” American Economic Review, V.89-#5, 1135-55.

■ Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). “Is Protection for Sale? Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Theory of Endogenous Protection.” Review of Economics and Statistics, V.82-#1, 139-52.

■ Eicher and Osang (2002). “Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation: Comment.” American Economic Review, V.92-#5, 1702-10.

■ Matschke and Sherlund (2006). “Do Labor Issues Matter in the Determination of U.S. Trade Policy? An Empirical Reevaluation.” American Economic Review, V.96-#1, 405-21.

■ Yotov (2010). “Trade-Induced Unemployment: How Much Do We Care?Review of International Economics, V.18-#5, 972-89.

■ Imai, Katayama and Krishna (2009). “Is Protection Really for Sale? A Survey and Directions for Future Research.” International Review of Economics & Finance, V.18-#2, 181-91.

○ Imai, Katayama and Krishna (2009). “Protection for Sale or Surge Protection?European Economic Review, V.53-#6, 675-88.

○ Imai, Katayama and Krishna (2013). “A Quantile-Based Test of Protection for Sale Model.” Journal of International Economics, V.91-#1, 40-52.

○ Mitra, Thomakos and Ulubasoglu (2006). “Can We Obtain Realistic Parameter Estimates for the ‘Protection for Sale’ Model?” Canadian Journal of Economics, V.39-#1, 187-210.

○ Ederington and Minier (2008). “Reconsidering the Empirical Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Model of Endogenous Protection.” Canadian Journal of Economics, V.41-#2, 501-16.

○ Gawande and Li (2009). “Dealing with Weak Instruments: An Application to the Protection for Sale Model.” Political Analysis, V.17-#3, 236-60.

○ Gawande, Krishna and Olarreaga (2009). “What Governments Maximize and Why: The View from Trade.” International Organization, V.63-#3, 491-532.

○ Gawande, Krishna and Olarreaga (2012). “Lobbying Competition over Trade Policy.” International Economic Review, V.53-#1, 115-32.

○ Belloc and Guerrieri (2008). “Special Interest Groups and Trade Policy in the EU.” Open Economies Review, V.19-#4, 457-78.

○ Evans and Sherlund (2011). “Are Antidumping Duties for Sale? Case-Level Evidence on the Grossman-Helpman Protection for Sale Model.” Southern Economic Journal, V.78-#2, 330-57.

○ Cadot, Dutoit, Grether and Olarreaga (2013). “Endogenous Tariffs in a Common-Agency Model: A New Empirical Approach Applied to India.” Revista de Economia y Estadistica, V.51-#1, 25-52.

 

● Grossman-Helpman type Lobbying for Migration Policy

○ Chau (2003). “Concessional Amnesty and the Politics of Immigration Reforms.” Economics & Politics, V.15-#2, 193-224.

■ Facchini and Willmann (2005). “The Political Economy of International Factor Mobility.” Journal of International Economics, V.67-#1, 201-19.

Facchini and Mayda (2008). “From Individual Attitudes Towards Migrants to Migration Policy Outcomes: Theory and Evidence.” Economic Policy, -#56, 65 –713.

○ Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2011). “Do Interest Groups Affect US Immigration Policy?Journal of International Economics, V.85-#1, 114-28.

○ Kerr, Lincoln and Mishra (2014). “The Dynamics of Firm Lobbying.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, V.6-#4, 343-79.

■ Facchini, Mayda and Mishra (2015). “Lobbying Expenditures on Migration: A Descriptive Analysis.” CESifo Economic Studies, V.61-#3-4, 560-604.

 

● Political Economy of Trade v. Immigration

■ Mayda (2008). “Why are People More Pro-Trade than Pro-Migration?”. Economics Letters; V.101-#3, pp. 160-163.

■ Hatton (2007). “A Dual Policy Paradox: Why have Trade and Immigration Policies always Differed in Labor Scarce Economies?” in T. J. Hatton, K. H. O’Rourke and A. M. Taylor (eds), The New Comparative Economic History: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey G. Williamson . Cambridge Mass: MIT Press.

■ Greenaway and Nelson (2010). “The Politics of (Anti-) Globalization: What Do We Learn from Simple Models?”. in N. Gaston and A. Khalid, eds. Globalization and Economic Integration: Winners and Losers in the Asia-Pacific. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, pp. 69-92.

■ Conconi, Facchini, Steinhardt, Zanardi (2012). “The Political Economy of Trade and Migration: Evidence from the US Congress”. HWWI Research Paper, #136.

○ Peters (2014). “Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Immigration Policy Making in the United States.” International Organization, V.68-#04, 811-44.

○ Schwellnus (2008). “The Non-Traded Sector, Lobbying, and the Choice between the Customs Union and the Common Market”. Economics and Politics, V.20-#3, pp. 361-90.

○ Facchini and Testa (2009). “Who Is against a Common Market?”. Journal of the European Economic Association, V.7-#5, pp. 1068-100.

○ Burgoon (2012). “Partisan Embedding of Liberalism: How Trade, Investment, and Immigration Affect Party Support for the Welfare State.” Comparative Political Studies, V.45-#5, 606-35.

○ Bougheas, Spiros and Douglas Nelson (2013). “On the Political Economy of High Skilled Migration and International Trade.” European Economic Review, V.63-#0, 206-24.

 

Topic V. Current topics in political economy

 ● Firms in the political economy of trade

■ Bombardini (2008). “Firm Heterogeneity and Lobby Participation.” Journal of International Economics, V.75-#2, 329-48.

Bombardini and Trebbi (2012). “Competition and Political Organization: Together or Alone in Lobbying for Trade Policy?” Journal of International Economics, V.87-#1, 18-26.

Abel-Koch (2013). “Endogenous Trade Policy with Heterogeneous Firms,” University of Mainz discussion paper, #1306.

Chang and Willmann (2006). “Protection for Sale with Heterogeneous Interests within Industries.” Unpublished working paper.

Owen and Quinn. (2016). “Does Economic Globalization Influence the US Policy Mood?: A Study of US Public Sentiment, 1956-2011.” British Journal of Political Science, V.46-#1, 95-125.

Osgood (2016). “Differentiated Products, Divided Industries: Firm Preferences over Trade Liberalization.” Economics & Politics, V.28-#2, 161-80.

Osgood (2017). “The Breakdown of Industrial Opposition to Trade: Firms, Product Variety, and Reciprocal Liberalization.” World Politics, V.69-#1, 184-231.

Osgood, Tingley, Bernauer, Kim, Milner and Spilker (2017). “The Charmed Life of Superstar Exporters: Survey Evidence on Firms and Trade Policy.” The Journal of Politics, V.79-#1, 133-52.

Kim (forth). “Political Cleavages within Industry: Firm Level Lobbying for Trade Liberalization.” American Political Science Review.

○ Costinot (2009). “Jobs, Jobs, Jobs: A “New” Perspective on Protectionism.” Journal of the European Economic Association, V.7-#5, 1011-41.

○ Milner (1987). “Resisting the Protectionist Temptation: Industry and the Making of Trade Policy in France and the United States During the 1970s.” International Organization, V.41-#4, 639-65.

Alt, Carlsen, Heum and Johansen (1999). “Asset Specificity and the Political Behavior of Firms: Lobbying for Subsidies in Norway.” International Organization, V.53-#1, 99-116.

Hansen and Mitchell. (2001). “Globalization or National Capitalism: Large Firms, National Strategies, and Political Activities.” Business and Politics, V.3-#1, 5-19.

 

● Adjusting to the “China Shock”

Autor, Dorn and Hanson (2013). “The China Syndrome: Local Labor Market Effects of Import Competition in the United States.” American Economic Review, V.103-#6, 2121-68.

■ Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Majlesi (2016). “Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure,” NBER Working Paper, #22637.

■ Autor, Dorn, Hanson and Majlesi (2017). “A Note on the Effect of Rising Trade Exposure on the 2016 Presidential Election,” MIT Economics Department Working Paper.

○ Feigenbaum and Hall (2015). “How Legislators Respond to Localized Economic Shocks: Evidence from Chinese Import Competition.” The Journal of Politics, V.77-#4, 1012-30.

○ Che, Lu, Pierce, Schott and Tao (2016). “Does Trade Liberalization with China Influence US Elections?,” NBER Working Paper, #22178.

○ Dippel, Gold and Heblich (2015). “Globalization and Its (Dis-) Content: Trade Shocks and Voting Behavior,” NBER Working Paper, #21812.

 

● Conclusion: Rethinking the Political Economy of Globalization