Law & Economics of International Trade
Professor: Douglas Nelson
Office: Tilton 108 (Murphy Institute), Phone: 865-5317
Office Hours: Tuesday and Thursday, 3:00-5:00
In 2016, for the first time since before the Second World War, national international trade policies and the international arrangements providing a (relatively weak) regulatory framework have become significant public political issues in virtually all of the core countries of the liberal international trading system. The readings and lectures in this course seek to develop an understanding of the domestic and international foundations of international trade law. Positive law and economics is a branch of political economy, not a branch of welfare economics. We begin the course with some background in the economics and politics of a liberal international economy. Then we examine the role of law in a democratic, capitalist political economy. Having laid this foundation, we turn to detailed analysis of the way that system seeks to balance the gains from integration with losses of sovereignty. Then we consider a number of new issues facing the liberal international trading system: restructuring of the world economy to take advantage of global value chains; and the emergence of China as a significant economic and political actor. Finally, we examine some sources of crisis and potential alternatives. Our main international focus will be the World Trade Organization (WTO), though we will consider other multilateral and plurilateral organizations in passing; and our analysis of national policy with focus on the United states, though we will consider other countries in passing.
Evaluation: Your performance in this course will be evaluated on the basis of 2 examinations (worth points 100 points each) and 6 tutorial papers (worth a total of 100 points). To receive an A, you must earn at least 90 percent of the points available. To pass the course you must earn at least 60 percent of the points available. Grades between these limits will be determined on the basis of your performance relative to that of the class as a whole.
Readings for the course will be drawn from:
Bernard Hoekman & Michel Kostecki (2010). The Political Economy of the World Trading System: The WTO & Beyond. Oxford University Press. [Hoekman/Kostecki]
The syllabus also includes a number of additional readings, most available online and linked from the online version of this syllabus. Note that readings marked by a “■” are required and readings marked by a “○” are mostly there to remind me of things I should check, but they also make great supplementary readings.
Although not available from the bookstore, we will draw a couple of chapters (available in Canvas) from:
Henrik Horn & Petros Mavroidis (2013). Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. [Horn/Mavroidis]
If you are interested in more detail, the authors of the above book have produced more advanced and longer texts that are very good, indeed:
Petros Mavroidis (2016). The Regulation of International Trade: GATT. MIT Press.
Petros Mavroidis (2016) The Regulation of International Trade: The WTO Agreements on Trade in Goods. MIT Press.
Petros Mavroidis (2020). The Regulation of International Trade: The General Agreement on Trade in Services. MIT Press.
A couple of good, basic, books on international law, in general, are
Cecily Rose, et al. (2022). An Introduction to Public International Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Jan Klabbers (2021). International Law (3rd Edition). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
An interesting attempt to explain key economic concepts to lawyers in the context of a philosophically informed framework is.
Robin Malloy (2004). Law in a Market Context: An Introduction to Market Concepts in Legal Reasoning. Cambridge University Press.
An excellent book on how capitalism works, and sometimes doesn’t, is
John McMillan (2002). Reinventing the Bazaar: A Natural History of Markets. New York: Norton.
For an excellent non-specialist analysis of the development and current challenges of globalization, you can’t do better than:
Richard Baldwin (2016). The Great Convergence: Information Technology & the New Globalization. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Examination format. The format for both exams will be: about 40% short answer questions and about 60% essays. In general there will be more questions of both types than must be answered, so you will have some choice (though there is often one mandatory question which everyone must answer). The exams must be written in blue books, which you must supply.
Policy on examinations. The midterm exam will be taken during the class period on 9 March. Unless you have a standard university accepted excuse for missing the exam (e.g. health), you must take the exams at their scheduled time. If you miss the first exam there will be a makeup exam (given during finals week). Note: to be eligible to take a makeup exam you must have a legitimate excuse for having missed the regular exam. The final examination will only be given on the scheduled date: Monday, 8 May, 4:00-7:00pm.
Policy on short papers. I will divide the class into 3 groups. Every week, all members of one of those groups (to be specified on the first day of class) will prepare a paper on that week’s reading. The papers should identify and discuss some significant element of that week’s readings. The papers should be 3 or 5 pages long and, on a separate page, should include 5 questions for the group to discuss.
Some Good Advice (At No Extra Charge): First, keep current with the reading. Second, ask questions in class. If you read something and it is unclear and then it is unclear during lecture, ask about it. Your classmates will probably thank you. This is one of the few ways, before an exam, that I can gauge how the material is getting across. Third, come see me during my office hours. This is another opportunity to get clarification and help on material about which you are unclear. But don’t wait until the last minute, by then it is usually too late.
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The Code of Academic Conduct applies to all undergraduate students, full-time and part-time, in Tulane University. Tulane University expects and requires behavior compatible with its high standards of scholarship. By accepting admission to the university, a student accepts its regulations (i.e., Code of Academic Conduct and Code of Student Conduct) and acknowledges the right of the university to take disciplinary action, including suspension or expulsion, for conduct judged unsatisfactory or disruptive.
Religious Accommodation Policy
Per Tulane’s religious accommodation policy (with hyperlink), I will make every reasonable effort to ensure that students are able to observe religious holidays without jeopardizing their ability to fulfill their academic obligations. Excused absences do not relieve the student from the responsibility for any course work required during the period of absence. Students should notify me within the first two weeks of the semester about their intent to observe any holidays that fall on a class day or on the day of the final exam.
I am aware that Tulane students are able to read a standard university syllabus and determine the content of the course and its relation to the major and the individual student’s course of study. However, the administration of Tulane University, along with the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS–which “accredits” primary and secondary schools as well as all varieties of 2 and 4 year undergraduate programs [with very little in the way of adjustment in rubrics, metrics, etc.]), has determined that you require additional information. I collect this material in a separate section so that you can refer to it, or discard it, as you consider appropriate.
Relevant Program Outcomes Addressed in this Course:
- Understand and be able to apply basic economic analysis of trade policy.
- Understand the role of law in the links between the economy, civil society and the state in democratic capitalist countries and the extension of this analysis to a world of democratic capitalist countries.
- Understand the main elements of the legal structure regulating trade between nations. In particular, the way the detailed structure of the global trading system seeks to balance the gains from interdependence and the claims of sovereignty essential to any democratic political system.
- Use the tools of economic, political and legal analysis to identify the current pressures for change in the global trade regime.
- Use the tools of economic, political and legal analysis to evaluate current proposals for change in the global trade regime.
“Learning Objectives”: Upon completion of this course you should have developed a practical knowledge of:
Economic analysis of trade and related policies (i.e. application of the theory of economic policy);
Core concepts of legal analysis with particular application to economic relations in general and international trade relations in particular;
The functioning of the main institutions regulating international trade, with specific reference to the World Trade Organization, but extended to other arrangements.
Econ 3970 SYLLABUS Fall 2021
17 January: Course Introduction
Topic I: Framework
19, 24 & 26 January: Nation-States, Democracy & the Legitimation of Markets
■ Polanyi (1944). “Man, Nature, and Productive Organization”. Chapter 11 of The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press, pp. 130-134. [Canvas]
■ Chambers and Kopstein (2006). “Civil Society and the State,” in Dryzek, Honig and Phillips eds, The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 363-81.[Canvas]
■ Iversen (2006). “Capitalism and Democracy”. Chapter 33 in B. Weingast and D. Wittman, eds. Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 601-623.
○ Walzer (1991). “The Better Vision. The Idea of Civil Society, a Path to Social Reconstruction.” Dissent, Spring, 293-304. [Canvas]
○ Chambers, Simone and Jeffrey Kopstein (2001). “Bad Civil Society.” Political Theory, V.29-#6, 837-65.
○ Alexander (1997). “The Paradoxes of Civil Society.” International Sociology, V.12-#2, 115-33.
○ Held (1995). “The Development of the Modern State”. In S. Hall and B. Gieben, Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 55-89. [Canvas]
○ Mann (1988). “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results”. In States, War, and Capitalism. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 109-136.
31 January: The Essential Role of Law in the Support of Markets
■ Weber (1927). “The Meaning and Presuppostions of Modern Capitalism”, Chapter XXII of General Economic History. New York: Greenberg, pp. 275-278. [Canvas]
■ Trubek (1972). “Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism.” Wisconsin Law Review, V.1972-#3, 720-53.
■ Collins (1980). “Weber’s Last Theory of Capitalism: A Systematization”. American Sociological Review; V.45-#6, pp. 925-942.
○ Habermas (1995). “On the Internal Relation between the Rule of Law and Democracy.” European Journal of Philosophy, V.3-#1, 12-20. [Canvas]
○ Ford (2019). “Law and the Development of Capitalism,” in Hanke, Schaff and Whimster eds, The Oxford Handbook of Max Weber. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 89-109.
○ Rubin and Klumpp (2012). “Property Rights and Capitalism,” in D. C. Mueller ed. The Oxford Handbook of Capitalism. New York: OUP, 204-19.
○ La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer (2008). “The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins.” Journal of Economic Literature, V.46-#2, 285-332.
○ Jackson (1998). “Global Economics and International Economic Law.” Journal of International Economic Law, V.1-#1, 1-23.
2 & 7 February: The Problem of International Law
■ Raustiala & Slaughter (2002). “International law, international relations and compliance”. in Carlsnaes, Risse & Simmons, eds. Handbook of International Relations. Thousand Oaks: Sage, 538-558. [Canvas]
■ Steinberg (2013). “Wanted–Dead or Alive: Realism in International Law,” in J. L. Dunoff and M. A. Pollack eds, Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations: The State of the Art. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 146-72. [Canvas]
○ Weiler, Joseph HH (2004). “The Geology of International Law: Governance, Democracy and Legitimacy.” Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, V.46, 547-62.
○ Simma and Pulkowski (2006). “Of Planets and the Universe: Self-Contained Regimes in International Law.” European Journal of International Law, V.17-#3, 483-529.
○ Slaughter (1995). “International Law in a World of Liberal States.” European Journal of International Law, V.6-#3, 503-38.
○ Moravcsik (2013). “Liberal Theories of International Law,” in Dunoff and Pollack eds, Interdisciplinary Perspectives on International Law and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 83-118.
○ Koh (1997). “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?” The Yale Law Journal, V.106-#8, 2599-659.
○ Waldron (2006). “The Rule of International Law.” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, V.30-#1, 15-30.
○ Waldron (2011). “Are Sovereigns Entitled to the Benefit of the International Rule of Law?” European Journal of International Law, V.22-#2, 315-43.
○ Besson (2011). “Sovereignty, International Law and Democracy.” European Journal of International Law, V.22-#2, 373-87.
○ Abbott, Keohane, Moravcsik, Slaughter and Snidal (2000). “The Concept of Legalization.” International Organization, V.54-#3, 401-19.
○ Abbott and Snidal (2000). “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance.” International Organization, V.54-#3, 421-56.
○ Kahler (2000). “Conclusion: The Causes and Consequences of Legalization.” International Organization, V.54-#3, 661-83.
○ Finnemore and Toope (2001). “Alternatives to “Legalization”: Richer Views of Law and Politics.” International Organization, V.55-#3, 743-58.
○ Diehl, Ku and Zamora (2003). “The Dynamics of International Law: The Interaction of Normative and Operating Systems.” International Organization, V.57-#1, 43-75.
○ Wolfers (1951). “The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference.” World Politics, V.4-#1, 39-63
○ Krasner (2001). “Sovereignty.” Foreign Policy, -#122, 20-29.
○ Jackson (2003). “Sovereignty-Modern: A New Approach to an Outdated Concept.” The American Journal of International Law, V.97-#4, 782-802.
○ Raustiala (2003). “Rethinking the Sovereignty Debate in International Economic Law.” Journal of International Economic Law, V.6-#4, 841-78.
○ Slaughter (2004). “Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World Order.” Stanford Journal of International Law, V.40-#2, 283-327.
Optional Topic: Why We Trade: The Basic Economics of Gains from Trade
■ Krugman (1993). “What Do Undergrads Need to Know About Trade?” The American Economic Review, V.83-#2, 23-26.
■ Hoekman/Kostecki, Annex 2 (pp. 676-680).
■ Sykes (1998). “Comparative Advantage and the Normative Economics of International Trade Policy.” Journal of International Economic Law, V.1-#1, 49-70.
○ Feenstra (2018). “Alternative Sources of the Gains from International Trade: Variety, Creative Destruction, and Markups.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.32-#2, 25-46.
○ Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare. (2018). “The US Gains from Trade: Valuation Using the Demand for Foreign Factor Services.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.32-#2, 3-24.
○ Egger, Francois, Manchin and Nelson (2015). “Non-Tariff Barriers, Integration and the Transatlantic Economy.” Economic Policy, V.30-#83, 539-84.
○ Irwin, (2005). “The Welfare Cost of Autarky: Evidence from the Jeffersonian Trade Embargo, 1807–09.” Review of International Economics, V.13-#4, 631-45.
○ Bernhofen and Brown (2017) “Gains from trade: evidence from 19th century Japan”. Microeconomic Insights August 31, 2017.
○ Feenstra (1992). “How Costly Is Protectionism?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.6-#3, 159-78.
○ Amiti, Redding and Weinstein (2019). “The Impact of the 2018 Tariffs on Prices and Welfare.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.33-#4, 187-210.
○ Amiti, Redding and Weinstein (2020). “Who’s Paying for the US Tariffs? A Longer-Term Perspective.” AEA Papers and Proceedings, V.110, 541-46.
9 February: Adjusting to Trade: The Long and the Short of It
■ Haskel, Lawrence, Leamer and Slaughter (2012). “Globalization and U.S. Wages: Modifying Classic Theory to Explain Recent Facts.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.26-#2, 119-40.
■ Autor (2018). “Trade and Labor Markets: Lessons from China’s Rise”. IZA World of Labor; 2018: 431.
○ Fort, Pierce and Schott (2018). “New Perspectives on the Decline of US Manufacturing Employment.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.32-#2, 47-72.
○ Feenstra and Sasahara (2018). “The ‘China Shock,’ Exports and U.S. Employment: A Global Input–Output Analysis.” Review of International Economics, V.26-#5, 1053-83.
○ Jansen, Peters & Salazar-Xirinachs (2011). Trade and Employment: From Myths to Facts. Geneva: International Labor Office.
○ Groshen, Hobijn and McConnell (2005). “US Jobs Gained and Lost through Trade: A Net Measure.” Current Issues in Economics and Finance, V.11-#8, 1-7.
○ Ubaldo and Winters (2014). “International Trade Regulation and Job Creation.” IZA World of Labor, V.75-#2, 1-10.
14 February: Policy Spillovers: The Good, the Bad & the Ugly
■ Hoekman & Nelson “Rethinking International Subsidy Rules“. 2020. The World Economy; V.43-#12, pp. 3104-3111.[Canvas]
■ Francois, Hoekman & Nelson (forthcoming). “Trade and Sustainable Development: Non-Economic Objectives in the Theory of Economic Policy,” forthcoming. World Trade Review,
■ Hoekman/Kostecki, Annex 2 (pp. 692-697).
■ Krugman (1997). “What Should Trade Negotiators Negotiate About?” Journal of Economic Literature, V.35-#1, 113-20.
○ Sykes (1998). “Comparative Advantage and the Normative Economics of International Trade Policy.” Journal of International Economic Law, V.1-#1, 71-82.
○ Johnson (1963). “Optimal Trade Intervention in the Presence of Domestic Distortions,” in R. E. Baldwin and others eds, Trade, Growth and the Balance of Payments. Chicago: Rand McNally & Company, 3-34.
○ Corden (1997). Trade Policy & Economic Welfare. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
○ Turunen-Red (1987). “Economic Inequality and Public Policy in a Small Open Economy.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, V.89-#2, 437-51.
○ Turunen-Red and Woodland (2002). “Unilateral Reforms of Trade and Environmental Policy,” in A. D. Woodland ed Economic Theory and International Trade: Essays in Honour of Murray C. Kemp. Cheltenham, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 124-40.
○ Turunen-Red and Woodland (2004). “Multilateral Reforms of Trade and Environmental Policy.” Review of International Economics, V.12-#3, 321-36.
○ Neary (2006). “International Trade and the Environment: Theoretical and Policy Linkages.” Environmental and Resource Economics, V.33-#1, 95-118.
○ Beghin, Roland-Holst and Van Der Mensbrugghe (1997). “Trade and Pollution Linkages: Piecemeal Reform and Optimal Intervention.” The Canadian Journal of Economics, V.30-#2, 442-55.
○ Chau, Färe and Grosskopf (2013). “Trade Restrictiveness and Pollution.” Journal of Public Economic Theory, V.15-#1, 25-52.
16 February: The Evolution of the Post-War Liberal Trading System
■ Hoekman/Kostecki, Chapters 2 & 4 (pp. 131-146).
■ Ruggie (1982). “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post-War Economic Order.” International Organization, V.36-#2, 379-415.
○ Lang (2006). “Reconstructing Embedded Liberalism: John Gerard Ruggie and Constructivist Approaches to the Study of the International Trade Regime.” Journal of International Economic Law, V.9-#1, 81-116.
○ Finlayson and Zacher (1981). “The GATT and the Regulation of Trade Barriers: Regime Dynamics and Functions.” International Organization, V.35-#4, 561-602.
○ Lipson (1982). “The Transformation of Trade: The Sources and Effects of Regime Change.” International Organization, V.36-#2, 417-55.
○ Irwin, Mavroidis and Sykes (2008). The Genesis of the GATT. New York: Cambridge University Press.
○ VanGrasstek (2013). The History and Future of the World Trade Organization. Geneva, Switzerland: World Trade Organization.
○ Koopman, Hancock, Piermartini and Bekkers (2020). “The Value of the WTO.” Journal of Policy Modeling, V.42-#4, 829-49.
Topic II: Legal Structure of Liberalization Norms
23 & 28 February: Liberalization through Negotiation
■ Grossman & Horn (2013). “Why the WTO? An Introduction to the Economics of Trade Agreements”. Chapter 2, Horn/Mavroidis, pp. 9-67. [Also Canvas]
■ Hoekman/Kostecki, Chapters 4 (pp. 146-183) & 5 (184-216).
○ Hoekman/Kostecki, Chapters 6 & 7.
○ Bagwell, Staiger and Sykes. “Border Instruments.” Chapter 3, Horn/Mavroidis, pp. 68-204.
○ Keohane (1986). “Reciprocity in International Relations.” International Organization, V.40-#1, 1-27.
○ Ruggie (1992). “Multilateralism: The Anatomy of an Institution.” International Organization, V.46-#3, 561-98.
○ Mayer (1981). “Theoretical Considerations on Negotiated Tariff Adjustments.” Oxford Economic Papers, V.33-#1, 135-53.
○ Riezman (1982). “Tariff Retaliation from a Strategic Viewpoint.” Southern Economic Journal, V.48-#3, 583-93.
○ Ethier (2007). “The Theory of Trade Policy and Trade Agreements: A Critique.” European Journal of Political Economy, V.23-#3, 605-23.
○ Regan (2015). “Explaining Trade Agreements: The Practitioners’ Story and the Standard Model.” World Trade Review, V.14-#3, 391-417.
○ Rose (2004). “Do WTO Members Have More Liberal Trade Policy?” Journal of International Economics, V.63-#2, 209-35.
○ Subramanian and Wei (2007). “The WTO Promotes Trade, Strongly but Unevenly.” Journal of International Economics, V.72-#1, 151-75.
Alt: Supporting Liberalization: Non-Discrimination & Transparency
■ Either — Horn and Mavroidis (2001). “Economic and Legal Aspects of the Most-Favored-Nation Clause.” European Journal of Political Economy, V.17-#2, 233-79.
■ Or — Grossman, Horn, Mavroidis (2012). “Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law: National Treatment”. Chapter 4, Horn/Mavroidis, pp. 205-240 (241-345 optional).
■ And –Collins-Williams and Wolfe (2010). “Transparency as a Trade Policy Tool: The WTO’s Cloudy Windows.” World Trade Review, V.9-#4, 551-81.
2 March: Non-Discrimination: MFN & National Treatment
■ Horn and Mavroidis (2001). “Economic and Legal Aspects of the Most-Favored-Nation Clause.” European Journal of Political Economy, V.17-#2, 233-79.
○ Bagwell and Staiger (2001). “Reciprocity, Non-Discrimination and Preferential Agreements in the Multilateral Trading System.” European Journal of Political Economy, V.17-#2, 281-325.
○ Bagwell and Robert Staiger (2005). “Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Bilateral Opportunism and the Rules of GATT/WTO.” Journal of International Economics, V.67-#2, 268-94.
○ Ethier (2004). “Political Externalities, Nondiscrimination, and a Multilateral World.” Review of International Economics, V.12-#3, 303-20.
○ Ludema (1991). “International Trade Bargaining and the Most-Favored-Nation Clause.” Economics & Politics, V.3-#1, 1-20.
○ Ludema and Mayda (2009). “Do Countries Free Ride on MFN?” Journal of International Economics, V.77-#2, 137-50.
○ Schwartz and Sykes (1997). “The Economics of the Most Favored Nation Clause,” in J. S. Bhandari and A. O. Sykes eds, Economic Dimensions in International Law: Comparative and Empirical Perspectives. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 43-79.
○ Caplin and Krishna (1988). “Tariffs and the Most Favored Nation Clause: A Game Theoretic Approach.” Seoul Journal of Economics, V.1-#3, 267-89.
○ McCalman (2002). “Multi-Lateral Trade Negotiations and the Most Favored Nation Clause.” Journal of International Economics, V.57-#1, 151-76.
○ Saggi (2004). “Tariffs and the Most Favored Nation Clause.” Journal of International Economics, V.63-#2, 341-68.
○ Saggi (2009). “The MFN Clause, Welfare, and Multilateral Cooperation between Countries of Unequal Size.” Journal of Development Economics, V.88-#1, 132-43.
■ Grossman, Horn, Mavroidis (2012). “Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law: National Treatment”. Chapter 4, Horn/Mavroidis, pp. 205-353 (just 226-241). [Canvas]
○ Gerhart and Baron (2004). “Understanding National Treatment: The Particpatory Vision of the WTO.” Indiana International & Comparative Law Review, V.14-#3, 505-52.
○ Horn and Mavroidis (2004). “Still Hazy after All These Years: The Interpretation of National Treatment in the GATT/WTO Case-Law on Tax Discrimination.” European Journal of International Law, V.15-#1, 39-69.
○ Horn (2006). “National Treatment in the GATT.” American Economic Review, V.96-#1, 394-404.
○ Saggi and Sara (2008). “National Treatment at the WTO: The Roles of Product and Country Heterogeneity.” International Economic Review, V.49-#4, 1365-94.
○ Staiger and Sykes (2011). “International Trade, National Treatment, and Domestic Regulation.” The Journal of Legal Studies, V.40-#1, 149-203.
7 March: Building & Sustaining a Deliberative Community: TPRs, STCs, etc.
■ Hoekman/Kostecki, Chapters 5 (236-259).
■ Haas (1992). “Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination“. International Organization, V46-#1, 1-35.
○ Drake & Nicolaïdis (1992). “Ideas, Interests and Institutionalization: ‘Trade in Services’ and the Uruguay Round“. International Organization, V46-#1, 37-100.
■ Horn, Mavroidis and Wijkstrom (2013). “In the Shadow of the DSU: Addressing Specific Trade Concerns in the WTO SPS and TBT Committees.” Journal of World Trade, V.47-#4, 729-59. [Canvas]
○ Karttunen (2020). Transparency in the WTO SPS and TBT Agreements: The Real Jewel in the Crown. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
■ Chaisse and Chakraborty (2007). “Implementing WTO Rules through Negotiations and Sanctions: The Role of Trade Policy Review Mechanism and Dispute Settlement System.” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, V.28, 153-85.
○ Nelson (2019). “Facing up to Trump Administration Mercantilism: The 2018 WTO Trade Policy Review of the United States.” The World Economy, V.42-#12, 3430-37.
○ Lang and Scott (2009). “The Hidden World of WTO Governance.” European Journal of International Law, V.20-#3, 575-614.
○ Stasavage (2004). “Open-Door or Closed-Door? Transparency in Domestic and International Bargaining.” International Organization, V.58-#4, 667-703.
■ Collins-Williams and Wolfe (2010). “Transparency as a Trade Policy Tool: The WTO’s Cloudy Windows.” World Trade Review, V.9-#4, 551-81.
○ Wolfe (2005). “See You in Geneva? Legal (Mis)Representations of the Trading System.” European Journal of International Relations, V.11-#3, 339-65.
○ Wolfe (2020). “Informal Learning and WTO Renewal: Using Thematic Sessions to Create More Opportunities for Dialogue,” Global Economic Dynamics Working Paper.
○ Wolfe (2020). “Yours Is Bigger Than Mine! How an Index Like the PSE Helps in Understanding the Comparative Incidence of Subsidies,” Global Economic Dynamics Working Paper.
Midterm: 9 March.
Midterm review: 14 March.
Topic III: Legal Structure of Sovereignty Norms
16 March: Safeguards–Introduction & The “Escape Clause”
■ Hoekman/Kostecki, Chapter 9 (pp. 413-430 & 460-473) & Annex 2, pp. 681-686.
■ Sykes (2003). “The Safeguards Mess: A Critique of WTO Jurisprudence.” World Trade Review, V.2-#3, 261-95.
○ Irwin (2003). “Causing Problems? The WTO Review of Causation and Injury Attribution in US Section 201 Cases.” World Trade Review, V.2-#3, 297-325.
■ Kucik and Reinhardt (2008). “Does Flexibility Promote Cooperation? An Application to the Global Trade Regime.” International Organization, V.62-#3, 477-505.
○ Mavroidis (2016). “Safeguards”. Chapter 4 of The Regulation of International Trade, Volume 2: The WTO Agreements on Trade in Goods. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 313-376.
○ Pelc (2016). Making and Bending International Rules: The Design of Exceptions and Escape Clauses in Trade Law. New York: Cambridge University Press.
○ Corden (1997). “The Conservative Social Welfare Function”. section 5.3 of Trade Policy and Economic Welfare. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 72-76.
○ Deardorff (1987). “Safeguards and the Conservative Social Welfare Function,” in Kierzkowski ed. Protection and Competition in International Trade. Oxford: Blackwell, 22-40.
○ Anderson and Zanardi (2009). “Political Pressure Deflection.” Public Choice, V.141-#1-2, 129-50.ade Alert.
21 March: Dumping & Antidumping
■ Hoekman/Kostecki, Chapters 9 (pp. 431-455).
○ Deardorff (1989). “Economic Perspectives on Antidumping Law,” in Jackson and Vermulst eds, Antidumping Law and Practice: A Comparative Study. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 23-39. [Canvas]
○ Irwin (2005). “The Rise of US Antidumping Actions in Historical Perspective.” World Economy, V.28-#5, 651-68.
■ Bown (2011). “Taking Stock of Antidumping, Safeguards and Countervailing Duties, 1990–2009.” The World Economy, V.34-#12, 1955-98.
○ Lloyd (2005). “Anti-Dumping and Competition Law,” in Macrory, Appleton and Plummer eds, The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1666-81.
○ Mavroidis (2016). “Antidumping”. Chapter 2 of The Regulation of International Trade, Volume 2: The WTO Agreements on Trade in Goods. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 67-184.
○ Prusa (2005). “The Growing Problem of Antidumping Protection,” in Ito and Rose eds, International Trade in East Asia. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 329-59.
○ Egger and Nelson (2010). “How Bad Is Antidumping? Evidence from Panel Data.” Review of Economics and Statistics, V.93-#4, 1374-90.
○ Feinberg and Reynolds (2007). “Tariff Liberalisation and Increased Administrative Protection: Is There a Quid Pro Quo?” The World Economy, V.30-#6, 948-61.
○ Moore and Zanardi (2011). “Trade Liberalization and Antidumping: Is There a Substitution Effect?” Review of Development Economics, V.15-#4, 601-19.
○ Bown (2013). “How Different Are Safeguards from Antidumping? Evidence from US Trade Policies toward Steel.” Review of Industrial Organization, V.42-#4, 449-81.
23 March: Subsidies and Countervailing Duties
■ Hoekman/Kostecki, Chapters 5 (pp. 216-236) & Chapter 9 (pp. 455-459).
■ Hoekman & Nelson (2021) “Rethinking International Subsidy Rules”. The World Economy, V.43-#12, pp. 3111-3116. [Canvas]
○ Snape, Richard H. (1991). “International Regulation of Subsidies.” The World Economy, V.14-#2, 139-64.
○ Sykes (1989). “Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective.” Columbia Law Review, V.89-#2, 199-263.
○ Sykes (2005). “Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,” in Macrory, Appleton and Plummer eds, The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis. Boston, MA: Springer US, 1682-706.
○ Rubini (2012). “Ain’t Wastin’ Time No More: Subsidies for Renewable Energy, the SCM Agreement, Policy Space, and Law Reform.” Journal of International Economic Law, V.15-#2, 525-79.
○ Mavroidis (2016). “Subsidies”. Chapter 3 of The Regulation of International Trade, Volume 2: The WTO Agreements on Trade in Goods. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 195-312.
○ Rubini (2009). The Definition of Subsidy and State Aid: WTO and EC Law in Comparative Perspective. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.
28 March: Disputes & Their Resolution
■ Hoekman/Kostecki, Chapter 4.
■ Horn and Mavroidis (2007). “International Trade: Dispute Settlement,” in A. T. Guzman and A. O. Sykes eds, Research Handbook in International Economic Law. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, Lt., 177-210. [Canvas]
○ Staiger and Sykes (2013). “Non-Violations.” Journal of International Economic Law, V.16-#4, 741-75.
■ Busch and Pelc (2015). “Dispute Settlement in the WTO,” in L. L. Martin ed The Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 400-16. [Canvas]
○ Mavroidis (2016). “Dispute Settlement in the WTO: Mind over Matter,” in Bagwell and Staiger eds, Handbook of Commercial Policy. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 333-77.
○ Mavroidis (2022). The WTO Dispute Settlement System: How, Why and Where?. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
○ Weiler (2001). “The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflections on the Internal and External Legitimacy of WTO Dispute Settlement.” Journal of World Trade, V.35-#2, 191-207.
○ Spamann (2006). “The Myth of ‘Rebalancing’ Retaliation in WTO Dispute Settlement Practice.” Journal of International Economic Law, V.9-#1, 31-79.
○ Fukunaga (2006). “Securing Compliance through the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Implementation of DSB Recommendations.” Journal of International Economic Law, V.9-#2, 383-426.
○ Kono (2007). “Making Anarchy Work: International Legal Institutions and Trade Cooperation.” The Journal of Politics, V.69-#3, 746-59.
○ Zangl (2008). “Judicialization Matters! A Comparison of Dispute Settlement under GATT and the WTO.” International Studies Quarterly, V.52-#4, 825-54.
○ Breuss (2004). “WTO Dispute Settlement: An Economic Analysis of Four EU–US Mini Trade Wars—a Survey.” Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, V.4-#4, 275-315.
○ Knorr, Bellmann and Schomaker (2012). “Subsidies in Civil Aircraft Manufacturing the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the Boeing-Airbus Dispute.” European State Aid Law Quarterly, V.11-#3, 585-600.
○ Neven and Sykes (2014). “United States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Second Complaint): Some Comments.” World Trade Review, V.13-#2, 281-98.
○ Buzard and Delimatsis (2019). “Subsidies and Investment Promotion Reaching New Heights in the Aviation Sector: The US–Tax Incentives Dispute.” World Trade Review, V.18-#2, 327-51.
○ Crivelli and Rubini (2019). “’Flying High in a Plane’ Appellate Body Report, European Communities and Certain Member States–Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil Aircraft (Wt/Ds316/Ab/Rw),” RSCAS Research Paper, #2019/78.
30 March: National Security
○ Wolfers (1951). “The Pole of Power and the Pole of Indifference.” World Politics, V.4-#01, 39-63.
○ Holsti (1986). “Politics in Command: Foreign Trade as National Security Policy.” International Organization, V.40-#3, 643-71.
■ Yoo and Ahn (2016). “Security Exceptions in the WTO System: Bridge or Bottle-Neck for Trade and Security?” Journal of International Economic Law, V.19-#2, 417-44.
■ Crivelli and Pinchis-Paulsen (2021). “Separating the Political from the Economic: The Russia–Traffic in Transit Panel Report.” World Trade Review, 1-24.
■ Hoekman, Mavroidis & Nelson (forthcoming). “Geopolitical Competition, Globalization and WTO Reform”. The World Economy,
○ Lester and Zhu (2019). “Closing Pandora’s Box: The Growing Abuse of the National Security Rationale for Restricting Trade,” Cato Institute Policy Analysis, #874.
○ Bown (2020). “Export Controls: America’s Other National Security Threat.” Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law, V.30-#2, pp. 283-308.
○ Pinchis-Paulsen (2020). “Trade Multilateralism and U.S. National Security: The Making of the GATT Security Exception.” Michigan Journal of International Law, V.41-#1, 109-93.
○ Blanco and Pehl (2020). National Security Exceptions in International Trade and Investment Agreements: Justiciability and Standards of Review. Springer Nature.
○ Schloemann and Ohlhoff (1999). “‘Constitutionalization’ and Dispute Settlement in the WTO: National Security as an Issue of Competence.” The American Journal of International Law, V.93-#2, 424-51.
○ McGuire (2006). “Uncertainty, Risk Aversion, and Optimal Defense against Interruptions in Supply.” Defence and Peace Economics, V.17-#4, 287-309.
○ Bown (forth.). “How Covid-19 Medical Supply Shortages Led to Extraordinary Trade and Industrial Policy,” Asian Economic Policy Review.
○ Pauwelyn (2020). “Export Restrictions in Times of Pandemic: Options and Limits under International Trade Agreements,” in Baldwin and Evenett eds, Covid-19 and Trade Policy: Why Turning Inward Won’t Work. London: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 103-09.
○Sykes (2020). “Short Supply Conditions and the Law of International Trade: Economic Lessons from the Pandemic.” American Journal of International Law, V.114-#4, 647-56.
○ Baldwin & Evenett, eds. (2020). COVID-19 and Trade Policy: Why Turning Inward Won’t Help. London: CEPR/VoxEU.
○ Evenett (2020). Tackling COVID-19 Together: The Trade Policy Dimension. St. Gallen: Global Trade Alert.
3-9 April, Tulane Spring Break
Topic IV: Current Issues
11 April: The New Globalization: GVCs and All That
○ Baldwin (2014). “Misthinking Globalisation: Twentieth-Century Paradigms and Twenty First-Century Challenges.” Australian Economic History Review, V.54-#3, 212-19.
○ Baldwin (2014). “WTO 2.0: Governance of 21st Century Trade.” The Review of International Organizations, V.9-#2, 261-83.
■ Hoekman (2016). “Subsidies, Spillovers and WTO Rules in a Value-Chain World.” Global Policy, V.7-#3, 351-59.
■ Hoekman, Mavroidis & Nelson (2023). “Noneconomic Objectives, Global Value Chains and International Cooperation”. RSCAS Working paper. [Canvas]
○ Blanchard (2015). “A Shifting Mandate: International Ownership, Global Fragmentation, and a Case for Deeper Integration under the WTO.” World Trade Review, V.14-#1, pp. 87-99.
○ Hoekman (2014). Supply Chains, Megaregionals and Multilateralism. London: CEPR Press.
○ Baldwin, Richard (2013). “Trade and Industrialisation after Globalisation’s Second Unbundling: How Building and Joining a Supply Chain Are Different and Why It Matters,” in R. C. Feenstra and A. M. Taylor eds, Globalization in an Age of Crisis: Multilateral Economic Cooperation in the Twenty-First. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 165-212.
○ Meyer (2020). “Trade Law and Supply Chain Regulation in a Post-Covid-19 World.” American Journal of International Law; V.114-#4, 637-46.
○ Bown (2021). “How Covid-19 Medical Supply Shortages Led to Extraordinary Trade and Industrial Policy,” PIIE working paper, #21-11.
○ Bown and Bollyky (2021). “How Covid-19 Vaccine Supply Chains Emerged in the Midst of a Pandemic,” PIIE working paper, #21-12.
13 April: Dealing with Subsidies (Including the “China problem”)
■ Hoekman & Nelson (2020) “Rethinking International Subsidy Rules”. The World Economy, V.43-#12, pp. 3117-3124. [Canvas]
■ Rubini (2012). “Ain’t Wastin’ Time No More: Subsidies for Renewable Energy, the SCM Agreement, Policy Space, and Law Reform.” Journal of International Economic Law, V.15-#2, 525-79.
○ Evenett & Fritz (2021). Subsidies and Market Access: Towards an Inventory of Corporate Subsidies by China, the EU and the United States (28th Global Trade Alert Report). London: CEPR Press.
○ Cosbey and Mavroidis (2014). “A Turquoise Mess: Green Subsidies, Blue Industrial Policy and Renewable Energy: The Case for Redrafting the Subsidies Agreement of the WTO.” Journal of International Economic Law, V.17-#1, 11-47.
○ Bown (2010). “China’s WTO Entry: Antidumping, Safeguards, and Dispute Settlement,” in Feenstra and Wei eds, China’s Growing Role in World Trade. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 281-337.
○ Hanson (2012). “The Rise of Middle Kingdoms: Emerging Economies in Global Trade.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.26-#2, 41-64.
■ Wu (2016). “The China, Inc. Challenge to Global Trade Governance.” Harvard International Law Journal, V.57-#2, 261-324.
■ Nelson (2021). “How Do You Solve a Problem Like Maria? US-Countervailing Measures (China) (21.5)”. 2021. World Trade Review, V.20-#4, pp. 556-565.
○ Wolfe (2017). “Sunshine over Shanghai: Can the WTO Illuminate the Murky World of Chinese SOEs?” World Trade Review, V.16-#4, 713-32.
○ Zhao (2015). “China Trade Strategy: FTAs, Mega-Regionals, and the WTO,” RSCAS Policy Paper, #2015/11.
○ Posen & Ha, eds. (2017). US-China Cooperation in a Changing Global Economy. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics.
○ Meltzer and Shenai (2019). “The US-China Economic Relationship: A Comprehensive Approach,” Global Economy & Development Policy Brief.
○ Mearsheimer (2010). “The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia.” The Chinese Journal of International Politics, V.3-#4, 381-96.
18 April: The Populist Backlash against Liberal Trade
■ Rodrik (2018). “Populism and the Economics of Globalization”. Journal of International Business Policy, V.1-#1/2, pp. 12-33.
■ Hoekman & Nelson (2018). “Reflecting on Populism and the Economics of Globalization”. Journal of International Business Policy, V.1-#1/2, pp. 34-43.
○ Colantone and Stanig (2018). “The Trade Origins of Economic Nationalism: Import Competition and Voting Behavior in Western Europe.” American Journal of Political Science, V.62-#4, 936-53.
○ Colantone and Stanig (2019). “The Surge of Economic Nationalism in Western Europe.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.33-#4, 128-51.
○ Autor, Dorn, Hansen & Majlesi (2020). “Importing Political Polarization? The Electoral Consequences of Rising Trade Exposure.” American Economic Review, V.110-#10, 3139-83.
○ Mutz (2021). Winners and Losers: The Psychology of Foreign Trade. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
○ Mutz (2021). “(Mis)Attributing the Causes of American Job Loss: The Consequences of Getting It Wrong.” Public Opinion Quarterly, V.85-#1, 101-22.
○ Wu (2022). “Misattributed Blame? Attitudes toward Globalization in the Age of Automation.” Political Science Research and Methods, V.10-#3, 470-87.
Topic V: Systemic Breakdown & Potential Responses
20 April: Is the WTO in Crisis?: Constitutional Failures & Hegemonic Decline
■ Nelson (2015). “Prospects for Constitutionalization of the WTO”. World Trade Review; V15-#1, pp. 135-153.
■ Howse and Nicolaidis (2003). “Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutionalization or Global Subsidiarity?” Governance-an International Journal of Policy and Administration, V.16-#1, 73-94.
○ Hudec (1996). “International Economic Law: The Political Theatre Dimension.” University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economic Law, V.1-#1, 9-15.
○ Finger and Dhar (1994). “Do Rules Control Power? GATT Articles and Arrangements in the Uruguay Round,” in Deardorff and Stern eds, Analytical and Negotiating Issues in the Global Trading System. Ann Arbor, MI.: University of Michigan Press, 195-223.
○ Trubek and Cottrell (2011). “Robert Hudec and the Theory of International Economic Law: The Law of Global Space,” in C. Thomas and J. P. Trachtman eds, Developing Countries in the WTO Legal System. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 129-50.
○ Jackson (1989). The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
○ Jackson (2006). Sovereignty, the WTO and Changing Fundamentals of International Law. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
○ Palmeter and Mavroidis (1998). “The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law.” The American Journal of International Law, V.92-#3, 398-413.
○ Palmeter (2000). “The WTO as a Legal System.” Fordham International Law Journal, V.24-#1/2, 444-80.
○ Cass (2001). “The ‘Constitutionalization’ of International Trade Law: Judicial Norm-Generation as the Engine of Constitutional Development in International Trade.” European Journal of International Law, V.12-#1, 39-75.
○ Brown (2000). “Cosmopolitanism, World Citizenship and Global Civil Society.” Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, V.3-#1, 7-26.
○ Bowden (2006). “Civil Society, the State, and the Limits to Global Civil Society.” Global Society, V.20-#2, 155-78.
○ Krasner (1976). “State Power and the Structure of International Trade.” World Politics, V.28-#3, 317-47.
○ Gowa (1989). “Rational Hegemons, Excludable Goods, and Small Groups: An Epitaph for Hegemonic Stability Theory?” World Politics, V.41-#3, 307-24.
○ Ikenberry and Kupchan (1990). “Socialization and Hegemonic Power.” International Organization, V.44-#3, 283-315.
○ Mearsheimer (2019). “Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal International Order.” International Security, V.43-#4, 7-50.
○ Heath, J. Benton (2020). “The New National Security Challenge to the Economic Order.” The Yale Law Journal, V.129-#4, 1020-98.
25 April: Issue Linkage as a Partial Response to Spillovers
■ Hoekman/Kostecki, Chapter 13.
■ Hoekman (1989). “Determining the Need for Issue Linkages in Multilateral Trade Negotiations.” International Organization, V.43-#4, 693-714.
○ Conconi (2018). “Linking Trade Policy to Non-Trade Issues: Selected Survey of the Literature,” RSCAS Working Paper,
○ Maggi (2016). “Issue Linkage,” Chapter 9 in Bagwell and Staiger eds, Handbook of Commercial Policy. North-Holland, 513-64.
○ Ederington (2002). “Trade and Domestic Policy Linkage in International Agreements.” International Economic Review, V.43-#4, 1347-67.
○ Conconi and Perroni (2002). “Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-in in Multilateral Negotiations.” Journal of International Economics, V.57-#2, 423-47.
20 April: Plausible Reforms of the WTO
■ Hoekman/Kostecki, Chapter 14 & 15.
○ Hoekman, et al. (2019). Revitalizing Multilateral Governance at the World Trade Organization: Report of the High-Level Board of Experts on the Future of Global Trade Governance. Gütersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann Stiftung.
■ McDougall (2018). “The Crisis in WTO Dispute Settlement: Fixing Birth Defects to Restore Balance.” Journal of World Trade, V.52-#6, 867-96.
○ Bown and Keynes (2020). “Why Trump Shot the Sheriffs: The End of WTO Dispute Settlement 1.0.” Journal of Policy Modeling.
○ Hoekman, Bernard M. and Petros C. Mavroidis (2020). “To AB or Not to AB? Dispute Settlement in WTO Reform.” Journal of International Economic Law.
27 April: Epistemic Communities & Management of International Conflict
■ Haas (1992). “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination.” International Organization, V.46-#1, 1-35.
○ Sebenius (1992). “Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation: Negotiation Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities.” International Organization, V.46-#1, 323-65.
○ Cross (2013). “Rethinking Epistemic Communities Twenty Years Later.” Review of International Studies, V.39-#1, 137-60.
■ Hoekman & Nelson (2020). “Rethinking International Subsidy Rules”. The World Economy, V.43-#12, pp. 3124-3129.
○ Drake and Nicolaïdis (1992). “Ideas, Interests, and Institutionalization: “Trade in Services” and the Uruguay Round.” International Organization, V.46-#01, 37-100.
○ Waarden and Drahos (2002). “Courts and (Epistemic) Communities in the Convergence of Competition Policies.” Journal of European Public Policy, V.9-#6, 913-34.
○ Wilks (2005). “Agency Escape: Decentralization or Dominance of the European Commission in the Modernization of Competition Policy?” Governance-an International Journal of Policy and Administration, V.18-#3, 431-52.
○ Woll and Artigas (2007). “When Trade Liberalization Turns into Regulatory Reform: The Impact on Business–Government Relations in International Trade Politics.” Regulation & Governance, V.1-#2, 121-38.
○ Meijerink (2005). “Understanding Policy Stability and Change. The Interplay of Advocacy Coalitions and Epistemic Communities, Windows of Opportunity, and Dutch Coastal Flooding Policy 1945–2003.” Journal of European Public Policy, V.12-#6, 1060-77.
○ Dunlop (2009). “Policy Transfer as Learning: Capturing Variation in What Decision-Makers Learn from Epistemic Communities.” Policy Studies, V.30-#3, 289-311.
○ Roth and Bourgine (2005). “Epistemic Communities: Description and Hierarchic Categorization.” Mathematical Population Studies, V.12-#2, 107-30.
○ Roth, Obiedkov and Kourie (2008). “Towards Concise Representation for Taxonomies of Epistemic Communities,” Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 240-55.
○ Zollman (2013). “Network Epistemology: Communication in Epistemic Communities.” Philosophy Compass, V.8-#1, 15-27.
2 May: Club Responses to WTO Shortcomings: Plurilaterals, “Deep” PTAs, etc
■ Hoekman/Kostecki, Chapters 10 & 11.
■ Hoekman and Mavroidis (2015). “Embracing Diversity: Plurilateral Agreements and the Trading System.” World Trade Review, V.14-#1, 101-16.
■ Hoekman and Sabel (2019). “Open Plurilateral Agreements, International Regulatory Cooperation and the WTO.” Global Policy, V.10-#3, 297-312.
○ Lawrence (2006). “Rulemaking Amidst Growing Diversity: A Club-of-Clubs Approach to WTO Reform and New Issue Selection.” Journal of International Economic Law, V.9-#4, 823-35.
○ Limão (2016). “Preferential Trade Agreements,” Chapter 6 in Bagwell and Staiger eds, Handbook of Commercial Policy. North-Holland, 279-367.
○ Ethier (1998). “The New Regionalism.” The Economic Journal, V.108-#449, 1149-61.
○ Hoekman and Nelson (2018). “Twenty-First-Century Trade Agreements and the Owl of Minerva.” Annual Review of Resource Economics, V.10-#1, 161-83.
○ Kim (2015). “Deep Integration and Regional Trade Agreements,” in Martin ed The Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 360-79.
○ Horn, Mavroidis and Sapir (2010). “Beyond the WTO? An Anatomy of EU and US Preferential Trade Agreements.” The World Economy, V.33-#11, 1565-88.
○ Horn, Mavroidis and Sapir (2011). “EU and US Preferential Trade Agreements: Deepening or Widening of WTO Commitments,” in Bagwell and Mavroidis eds, Preferential Trade Agreement: A Law and Economic Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 150-72.
○ Hoekman and Sabel (2017). “Trade Agreements, Regulatory Sovereignty and Democratic Legitimacy,” Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies Research Paper, #36.
○ Egger and Nigai (2015). “Effects of Deep Versus Versus Shallow Trade Agreements in General Equilibrium,” in Elsig and Dür eds, Trade Cooperation: The Purpose, Design and Effects of Preferential Trade Agreements. Cambridge University Press, 374-91.
○ Ahcar and Siroën (2017). “Deep Integration: Considering the Heterogeneity of Free Trade Agreements.” Journal of Economic Integration, V.32-#3, 615-59.
○ Orefice and Rocha (2014). “Deep Integration and Production Networks: An Empirical Analysis.” The World Economy, V.37-#1, 106-36.
○ Kim (2015). “Regionalization in Search of Regionalism: Production Networks and Deep Integration Commitments in Asia’s PTAs,” in Elsig and Dür eds, Trade Cooperation: The Purpose, Design and Effects of Preferential Trade Agreements. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 134-64.
○ Kim and Manger (2017). “Hubs of Governance: Path Dependence and Higher-Order Effects of Preferential Trade Agreement Formation.” Political Science Research and Methods, V.5-#3, 467-88.
Final Exam: Monday, 8 May, 4:00-7:00pm