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Econ 4980/6980: Economics of Migration





Econ 4980/6980

Economics of Migration


Professor: Douglas Nelson

Office: Tilton 108 (Murphy Institute), Phone: 865-5317

Office Hours: Tuesday and Thursday, 3:30-5:30

Phone: 865-5317

email: dnelson@tulane.edu

Webpage: http://nelson.wp.tulane.edu/


Migration is a policy issue of first-rate importance–in the US and virtually everywhere else in the world. Not surprisingly, migration has been a very active area of research for economists. Furthermore, migration is a topic where labor economics and international economics come together. This course seeks to apply the tools of economic theory and econometrics to understand a number of key elements of international migration: foundations of the individual decision to migrate and the choice of country of immigration; the factors affecting economic performance of migrants in host countries; factors underlying aggregate patterns of migration; the aggregate consequences of migration for host country economies (e.g. wages, unemployment, growth); the effects of policy on migration flows; the political economy of immigration policy; and normative (i.e. welfare) implications of migration on host and home countries. Given the centrality of this issue, most other fields in the social and behavioral sciences also work in this area–especially demography, sociology and political science–and, while we will occasionally draw on work from these areas when they bear directly on our economic analysis, our focus will be the economic analysis of migration.

This is an upper level Economics course. I assume that you are comfortable with standard tools of microeconomics (Econ 301) and macroeconomics (Econ 302). In particular, we will be making extensive use of consumer theory, producer theory, and general equilibrium theory. In addition, we will be drawing extensively on basic applied econometrics (Econ 323). Courses whose material might prove helpful, but not required, include: Labor Economics (Econ 381); World Economy (Econ 337); International Trading Relations (Econ 433), and Econometrics (Econ 423). I will also assume that you can follow and reproduce mathematical argument consistent with high school algebra and geometry, readings and lectures will sometimes involve basic calculus. I expect you to try to follow this work, but will not ask you to reproduce it.

Evaluation: Your performance in this course will be evaluated on the basis of 2 examinations (worth100 points each); and1 research paper (worth100 points). To receive an A, you must earn at least 90 percent of the points available. To pass the course you must earn at least 60 percent of the points available. Grades between these limits will be determined on the basis of your performance relative to that of the class as a whole.

Readings for the course will be drawn from:

Cynthia Bansak, Nicole Simpson & Madeline Zavodny (2015). The Economics of Immigration. New York: Routledge. [BSZ]

George Borjas (2014). Immigration Economics. Boston: Harvard University Press. [Borjas]

Many articles and papers. The syllabus contains many (many) more articles that we will be able to read. Required readings are marked by a black square, optional readings by an empty circle.

Both exams will have the following format: about 40% short answer questions and about 60% essays. In general there will be more questions of both types than must be answered, so you will have some choice (though there is often one mandatory question which everyone must answer). Exams must be written in blue books, which you must supply.

The midterm exam will be given on Tuesday, 3 October. Unless you have a standard university accepted excuse for missing the exam (e.g. health with standard university form), you must take the exams at their scheduled time. If you miss the midterm exam there will be a cumulative final exam given during regularly scheduled exam time. This exam will have 200 points worth of material and will be approximately twice as long as the final without the makeup section. (Note: to be eligible to take a makeup exam you must have a legitimate excuse for having missed the regular exam. That is, this is not a substitute for the mid term.) The final examination will only be given on the scheduled date: Sunday, 17 December at 1:00pm (there will be no exceptions so do not make travel plans that conflict with this).

Every student is required to produce a research paper on some aspect of the economics of immigration. These papers must be original work, plagiarism will not be tolerated. Broadly speaking, I expect papers in the 20-25 page range. To ensure that topics are well-established and suitable for the course, I require a proposal due no later than the date of the mid-term exam (Tuesday, 3 October). Late proposals will result in a 10 point penalty to be assessed on the paper’s final score. Research papers are due at the last regular meeting of the course (Thursday, 8 Decemberl). Late papers will not be accepted, and will earn a score of 0 points.

Possible topics could include: country studies (countries with extensive research to build from include: the US, Canada, the UK, Germany, Spain, Sweden, and Israel); major immigration shocks (e.g. the 1980 Mariel boatlift, 1990-1994 immigration of Russian jews to Israel, current immigration of Eastern accession countries to the UK); and policy questions (e.g. border enforcement, amnesty, allocation of immigrant quotas, refugee policy, etc.). There are, of course, many other possibilities. Note, well: the analysis is to be fundamentally positive, not normative. That is, while you might well draw normative conclusions (and those conclusions might be why you actually picked the topic), your paper will be evaluated strictly based on the positive analysis.

Some Good Advice (At No Extra Charge): First, keep current with the reading. Second, ask questions in class. If you read something and it is unclear and then it is unclear during lecture, ask about it. Your classmates will probably thank you. This is one of the few ways, before an exam, that I can gauge how the material is getting across. However, third, avoid questions that can be rendered into the form “are you wasting my time with this material” (e.g. “will this be on the exam”). Fourth, come see me during my office hours. This is another opportunity to get clarification and help on material about which you are unclear. But don’t wait until the last minute, by then it is usually too late.


Tulane/SACS Program & Learning Outcomes

Program outcomes: Relative to the educational objectives developed by the Economics Department to satisfy SACS requirements for accreditation, among other things, in this course the student should:

1. Apply the basic market model to explain and predict price changes in individual markets–in this course, the main application is labor markets, both national and international, though we are also interested in the interaction between labor markets and goods markets in general equilibrium.

2. Identify and assess the opportunity costs involved in any economic activity, whether the decision-maker is a private individual, business firm, or social organization. Individual, firm and governmental decisions relating to immigration will be analyzed in detail.

3. Identify economic issues and problems, gather data needed to evaluate them, and analyze that data to gain insights into economic behavior and formulate possible solutions. As the course objectives state at the beginning of this syllabus, we will be doing all of this with particular reference to international migration.

4. Apply the tools of economic analysis to specific policy issues at a level appropriate to both majors in Economics and the University community more generally. This is an upper level class, so the tools applies to the analysis of immigration and immigration policy are those consistent with such a level.

5. Gain an in-depth understanding of several specialized areas in economics, thereby learning how to apply microeconomic and macroeconomic theory to specific policy issues. Same as (4).

Learning objectives: After completing this course, the student should be able to apply formal and econometric methods to understand:

1. Foundations of the individual decision to migrate and the choice of country of immigration;

2. The factors affecting economic performance of migrants in host countries;

3. Factors underlying aggregate patterns of migration;

4. The aggregate consequences of migration for host country economies (e.g. wages, unemployment, growth);

5. The effects of policy on migration flows;

6. The political economy of immigration policy; and

7. Normative (i.e. welfare) implications of migration and migration policy on host and home


Econ 4980/6980                             SYLLABUS                                   Fall 2017

● 29 August: Course introduction

○ BSZ, Chapter 1

○ Freeman, Richard B. 2006. “People Flows in Globalization”. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 20(2), pp. 145-70.

Topic I. Microeconomics of Migration

● 31 August: Basic Models of Migration Choice

■ BSZ, Chapter 2

■ Sjaastad, Larry A. 1962. “The Costs and Returns of Human Migration”. Journal of Political Economy, 70(5), pp. 80-93.

○ Kennan, John and James R. Walker. 2011. “The Effect of Expected Income on Individual Migration Decisions.Econometrica, 79(1), 211-51.

○ Roback, Jennifer (1982). “Wages, Rents and the Quality of Life”. Journal of Political Economy; V.90-#6, pp. 1257-1278.

○ Carruthers, Norman and Aidan R. Vining. 1982. “International Migration: An Application of the Urban Location Choice Model.” World Politics, 35(1), pp. 106-20.

○ Borjas, George J. 1989. “Economic Theory and International Migration”. International Migration Review, 23(3), pp. 457-85.

○ Corden, W. Max and Ronald Findlay. 1975. “Urban Unemployment, Intersectoral Capital Mobility and Development Policy.” Economica, 42(165), pp. 59-78.

● 5 September: Risk and Asset Allocation to Migration by Households

■Stark, Oded and David Levhari (1982). “On Migration and Risk in LDCs”. Economic Development & Cultural Change; 31(1), pp. 191-196.

■ Burda, Michael C. 1995. “Migration and the Option Value of Waiting.” Economic and Social Review, 27(1), pp. 1-19.

○ Mincer, Jacob (1978). “Family Migration Decisions”. Journal of Political Economy; 86(5), pp. 749-773.

○ McCall, Brian P. and John J. McCall. 1987. “A Sequential Study of Migration and Job Search.” Journal of Labor Economics, 5(4), pp. 452-76.

○ Katz, Eliakim and Oded Stark (1986). “Labor Migration and Risk Aversion in Less-Developed Countries”. Journal of Labor Economics; 4(1), pp. 131-149.

○ Rosenzweig, Mark and Oded Stark (1989). “Consumption Smoothing, Migration, and Marriage: Evidence from Rural India,” Journal of Political Economy, 97(4), pp. 905-926.

○ Taylor, J.E., Rozelle, S. and de Brauw, A. (2003). “Migration and incomes in source communities: a new economics of migration perspective from China,” Economic Development and Cultural Change, 52(1), pp. 75-101.

○ Yang, Dean and HwaJung Choi (2007). “Are Remittances Insurance? Evidence from Rainfall Shocks in the Philippines,” World Bank Economic Review, 21(2), pp. 219-248.

○ Yang, Dean (2008), “International Migration, Remittances, and Household Investment: Evidence from Philippine Migrants’ Exchange Rate Shocks,” Economic Journal, 118, pp. 591-630.

○ Chen, Joyce (2006), “Migration and Imperfect Monitoring: Implications for Intra-household Allocation,” American Economic Review, 96(2), pp. 227-231.

● 7 & 12 September: Selection Models of Immigration

■ BSZ, Chapter 4

■ Borjas, Chapter 1

○ Borjas, George J. 1987. “Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants”. American Economic Review, 77(4), pp. 531-553. [Comment by Jasso & Rosenzweig, and Response]

○ Borjas, George J. 1991. “Immigration and Self-Selection”. In Immigration, Trade and Labor Market, ed. J. M. Abowd and R. B. Freeman, 29-76. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

○ Chiswick, Barry R. 1999. “Are Immigrants Favorably Self-Selected?American Economic Review, 89(2), 181-185.

○ Tunali, Insan (2000). “Rationality of Migration”. International Economic Review, 41(4), pp. 893-920.

○ Orrenius, Pia M. and Madeline Zavodny. 2005. “Self-Selection among Undocumented Immigrants from MexicoJournal of Development Economics, 78(1), pp. 215-40.

○ Ibarraran, Pablo and Darren Lubotsky (2005). “Mexican Immigration and Self-Selection”. In G. Borjas, ed. Mexican Immigration to the United States. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 159-192.

○ Chiquiar, Daniel and Gordon H. Hanson. 2005. “International Migration, Self-Selection, and the Distribution of Wages: Evidence from Mexico and the United StatesJournal of Political Economy, 113(2), pp. 239-81.

○ Lacuesta, Aitor. 2010. “A Revision of the Self-Selection of Migrants Using Returning Migrant’s Earnings.” Annales d’Économie et de Statistique, (97/98), 235-59.

○ Moraga, Jesús Fernández-Huertas. 2010. “New Evidence on Emigrant Selection.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 93(1), 72-96.

○ Kaestner, Robert and Ofer Malamud (2014). “Self-Selection and International Migration: New Evidence from Mexico”. Review of Economics and Statistics, V.96-#1, pp. 78-91.

○ Ambrosini, J. William and Giovanni Peri. 2012. “The Determinants and the Selection of Mexico–US Migrants.” The World Economy, 35(2), 111-51.

○ Bertoli, S.; J. Fernández-Huertas Moraga and F. Ortega. 2013. “Crossing the Border: Self-Selection, Earnings and Individual Migration Decisions.” Journal of Development Economics, 101(0), 75-91.

○ Roy, A. (1951). “Some thoughts on the distribution of earnings”. Oxford Economic Papers; 3(1), pp. 135-146.

○ Heckman, James and Guilherme Sedlacek (1985). “Heterogeneity, Aggregation, and Market Wage Functions: An Empirical Model of Self-Selection in the Labor Market”. Journal of Political Economy; 93(5), pp. 1077-1125.

○ Heckman, James and Bo Honoré (1990). “The Empirical Content of the Roy Model”. Econometrica; 58(5), pp. 1121-1149.

○ Dahl, Gordon (2002). “Mobility and the Return to Education: Testing a Roy Model with Multiple Markets”. Econometrica; 70(6), pp. 2367-2420.

● 14 September: The Role of Networks

■ Granovetter, Mark. 2005. “The Impact of Social Structure on Economic Outcomes”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; 19(1), pp. 33-50.

■ Massey, Douglas and Felipe García España (1987). “The Social Process of International Migration”. Science; 237(4816), pp. 733-738.

■ Winters, Paul, Alain de Janvry, and Elisabeth Sadoulet (2001). “Family and Community Networks in Mexico-US Migration”. Journal of Human Resources, 36(1), pp. 159-84.

■ McKenzie, David and Hillel Rapoport. 2010. “Self-Selection Patterns in Mexico-U.S. Migration: The Role of Migration Networks.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 92(4), 811-21.

○ Chau, Nancy H. 1997. “The Pattern of Migration with Variable Migration Cost.” Journal of Regional Science, 37(1), 35-54.

○ Wilson, Tamar. 1998. “Weak Ties, Strong Ties: Network Principles in Mexican Migration.” Human Organization, 57(4), 394-403.

○ Phillips, J. A. and D. S. Massey. 2000. “Engines of Immigration: Stocks of Human and Social Capital in Mexico”. Social Science Quarterly, 81(1), pp. 33-48.

○ McKenzie, David and Hillel Rapoport. 2007. “Network Effects and the Dynamics of Migration and Inequality: Theory and Evidence from Mexico”. Journal of Development Economics, 84(1), pp. 1-24.

○ Beine, Michel; Frédéric Docquier and Çağlar Özden. 2011. “Diasporas.” Journal of Development Economics, 95(1), 30-41.

○ Beine, Michel; Frederic Docquier and Çağlar Özden. 2011. “Dissecting Network Externalities in International Migration,” CESifo Group Munich, CESifo Working Paper Series: 3333,

○ Taylor, J. Edward (1986): “Differential Migration, Networks, Information, and Risk”. in O. Stark, ed. Migration, Human Capital and Development, Research in Human Capital and Development, New York: JAI Press, 141-173.

○ Massey, Douglas S. 1990. “Social Structure, Household Strategies, and the Cumulative Causation of Migration”. Population Index, 56(1), pp. 3-26.

○ Böcker, Anita G.M. 1994. “Chain Migration over Legally Closed Borders: Settled Immigrants as Bridgeheads and Gatekeepers”. The Netherlands Journal of Social Sciences, 30(2), pp. 87-106.

○ Boyd, Monica. 1989. “Family and Personal Networks in International Migration: Recent Developments and New Agendas”. International Migration Review, 23(3), pp. 638-70.

○ Fawcett, James T. 1989. “Networks, Linkages, and Migration Systems”. International Migration Review, 23(3), pp. 671-80.

○ Roberts, Kenneth and Michael Morris (2003). “Fortune, Risk, and Remittances: An Application of Option Theory to Participation in Village-Based Migration Networks”. International Migration Review; 37(4), pp. 1252-1281.

● 19 & 21 September: Basic Empirics on Immigration Choice and Pattern

■ BSZ, Chapter 3.

■ Massey, Douglas and Kristen Espinosa (1997): “What’s Driving Mexico-Us Migration? A Theoretical, Empirical, and Policy Analysis”. American Journal of Sociology, 102(4), 939-999.

■ Grogger, Jeffrey and Gordon Hanson. 2008. “Income Maximization and the Selection and Sorting of International Migrants”. Journal of Development Economics, 95(1), 42-57.

■ Francesc Ortega and Giovanni Peri (2013) “The Effect of Income and Immigration Policies on International Migration”. Migration Studies, Volume 1, page 47-74.

○ Burda, Michael C. 1993. “The Determinants of East-West German Migration: Some First Results.” European Economic Review, 37(2-3), pp. 452-61.

○ Burda, Michael C.; Wolfgang Hardle; Marlene Müller and Axel Werwatz. 1998. “Semiparametric Analysis of German East-West Migration Intentions: Facts and Theory.” Journal of Applied Econometrics, 13(5), pp. 525-41.

○ Greenwood, Michael J. and John M. McDowell. 1991. “Differential Economic Opportunity, Transferability of Skills, and Immigration to the United-States and Canada.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 73(4), pp. 612-23.

○ Karemera, David; Victor I. Oguledo and Bobby Davis. 2000. “A Gravity Model Analysis of International Migration to North America.” Applied Economics, 32(13), pp. 1745-55.

○ Clark, Ximena; Timothy J. Hatton and Jeffrey G. Williamson. 2007. “Explaining US Immigration, 1971-1998.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 89(2), pp. 359-73.

○ Hatton, Timothy (2005). “Explaining Trends in UK Migration”. Journal of Population Economics; 18(4), pp. 719-740.

○ Lewer, Joshua J. and Hendrik Van den Berg. 2008. “A Gravity Model of Immigration.” Economics Letters, 99(1), pp. 164-67.

○ Pedersen, Peder J.; Mariola Pytlikova and Nina Smith. 2006. “Migration into OECD Countries, 1990-2006,” In Immigration and the Transformation of Europe, ed. C. Parsons and T. Smeeding, 43-84. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

○ Pedersen, Peder J., Mariola Pytlikova and Nina Smith. 2008. “Selection and Network Effects: Migration Flows into OECD Countries 1990-2000”. European Economic Review, 52(7), pp. 1160-86.

Mayda, Anna Maria. 2008. “International Migration: A Panel Data Analysis of the Determinants of Bilateral Flows”. Journal of Population Economics, 23(4), 1249-74.

○ Belot, Michèle V. K. and Timothy J. Hatton. 2012. “Immigrant Selection in the OECD.” The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 114(4), 1105-28.

○ Fitzgerald, Jennifer; David Leblang and Jessica C. Teets. (2014). “Defying the Law of Gravity: The Political Economy of International Migration.” World Politics, V.66-#03, 406-45.

○ Borjas, George J. and B. Bratsberg. 1996. “Who Leaves? The Outmigration of the Foreign-Born”. Review of Economics and Statistics, 78(1), pp. 165-76.

Topic II. Immigrant Performance in the Host Country

● 26 September: Assimilation: Basic empirics

■ BSZ, Chapter 5

■ Borjas, Chapter 2

■ Duleep, Harriet Orcutt and Daniel J. Dowhan. 2008. “Research on Immigrant Earnings.” Social Security Bulletin, 68(1), 31-50.

■ Butcher, Kristin F. and John E. DiNardo. 2002. “The Immigrant and Native-Born Wage Distributions: Evidence from United States Censuses.” Industrial & Labor Relations Review, 56(1), 97-121.

○ Schultz, T. Paul. 1998. “Immigrant Quality and Assimilation: A Review of the US Literature.” Journal of Population Economics, 11(2), pp. 239-52.

○ Waters, Mary C. and Tomás R. Jiménez. 2005. “Assessing Immigrant Assimilation: New Empirical and Theoretical Challenges.” Annual Review of Sociology, 31, 105-25.

○ Chiswick, Barry R. 1978. “Effect of Americanization on Earnings of Foreign-Born Men.” Journal of Political Economy, 86(5), pp. 897-921.

○ Chiswick, Barry R. (1986). “Is the New Immigration Less Skilled Than the Old.Journal of Labor Economics, 4(2), 168-192.

○ Borjas, George J. 1985. “Assimilation, Changes in Cohort Quality, and the Earnings of Immigrants.” Journal of Labor Economics, 3(4), pp. 463-89.

○ Borjas, George J. 1995. “Assimilation and Changes in Cohort Quality Revisited: What Happened to Immigrant Earnings in the 1980s.” Journal of Labor Economics, 13(2), pp. 201-45.

○ Jasso, Guillermina and Mark R. Rosenzweig. 1988. “How Well Do Immigrants Do? Vintage Effects, Emigration Selectivity, and Occupational Mobility.” Research in Population Economics, 6, 229-53.

○ Jasso, Guillermina and Mark R. Rosenzweig. 1995. “Do Immigrants Screened for Skills Do Better Than Family Reunification Immigrants.” International Migration Review, 29(1), 85-111.

○ Lalonde, Robert J. and Robert H. Topel. 1991. “Immigrants in the American Labor Market: Quality, Assimilation, and Distributional Effects.” American Economic Review, 81(2), 297-302.

○ Lalonde, Robert J. and Robert H. Topel. 1991. “The Assimilation of Immigrants in the U.S. Labor Market,” G. J. Borjas and R. B. Freeman, Immigration and the Workforce. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, 67-92.

○ Duleep, Harriet O. and Mark C. Regets. 1996. “Earnings Convergence: Does It Matter Where Immigrants Come from or Why?Canadian Journal of Economics, 29, pp. S130-S34.

○ Duleep, Harriet O. and Mark C. Regets. 1997. “Measuring Immigrant Wage Growth Using Matched Cps Files.” Demography, 34(2), pp. 239-49.

Jasso, Guillermina; Mark R. Rosenzweig and James P. Smith2000. “The Changing Skill of New Immigrants to the United States – Recent Trends and Their Determinants,” G. J. Borjas, Issues in the Economics of Immigration, 185-225.

○ Friedberg, Rachel M. 2000. “You Can’t Take It with You? Immigrant Assimilation and the Portability of Human Capital.” Journal of Labor Economics, 18(2), 221-51.

○ Alba, Richard D.; Amy Lutz and Elena Vesselinov. 2001. “ How Enduring Were the Inequalities among European Immigrant Groups in the United States? Demography, 38(3), pp. 349-356.

○ Duncan, Brian and Stephen J. Trejo. 2006. “Ethnic Identification, Intermarriage, and Unmeasured Progress by Mexican Americans,” In Mexican Immigration, ed. G. J. Borjas, 229-67. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER.

○ Lubotsky, Darren. 2007. “Chutes or Ladders? A Longitudinal Analysis of Immigrant Earnings.” Journal of Political Economy, 115(5), pp. 820-67.

○ Barth, Erling; Bernt Bratsberg and Oddbjorn Raaum. 2004. “Identifying Earnings Assimilation of Immigrants under Changing Macroeconomic Conditions.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 106(1), 1-22.

○ Bratsberg, Bernt; Erling Barth and Oddbjørn Raaum. 2006. “Local Unemployment and the Relative Wages of Immigrants: Evidence from the Current Population Surveys.” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 88(2), 243-63.

○ Bratsberg, Bernt; Oddbjørn Raaum and Knut Røed. (2014). “Immigrants, Labour Market Performance and Social Insurance.” The Economic Journal, V.124-#580, F644-F83.

○ Beenstock, Michael; Barry R. Chiswick and Ari Paltiel. 2010. “Testing the Immigrant Assimilation Hypothesis with Longitudinal Data.” Review of Economics of the Household, 8(1), 7-27.

○ Chiswick, Barry R. and Paul W. Miller. 2011. “The ‘Negative’ Assimilation of Immigrants: A Special Case.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 64(3), 502-25.

○ Blau, Francine D.; Lawrence M. Kahn and Kerry L. Papps. 2011. “Gender, Source Country Characteristics, and Labor Market Assimilation among Immigrants.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 93(1), 43-58.

○ Lubotsky, Darren. 2010. “The Effect of Changes in the U.S. Wage Structure on Recent Immigrants’ Earnings.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 93(1), 59-71.

● Optional Topic: Intergenerational Assimilation

■ BSZ, Chapter 6

○ Card, David E.; John E. DiNardo and Eugenia Estes. 2000. “The More Things Change: Immigrants and Children of Immigrants in the 1940s, the 1970s, and the 1990s,” In Issues in the Economics of Immigration, ed. G. J. Borjas. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, pp. 227-270.

○ Algan, Yann; Christian Dustmann; Albrecht Glitz and Alan Manning. 2010. “The Economic Situation of First and Second-Generation Immigrants in France, Germany and the United Kingdom.” Economic Journal, 120(542), F4-30.

○ Casey, Teresa and Christian Dustmann. (2010). “Immigrants’ Identity, Economic Outcomes and the Transmission of Identity across Generations.” Economic Journal, V.120-#542, F31-51.

○ Sweetman, Arthur and Jan C. van Ours (2015). “Immigration: What About the Children and Grandchildren?,” in B. R. Chiswick and P. W. Miller eds, Handbook of the Economics of International Migration. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1141-93.

○ Black, Sandra E. and Paul J. Devereux (2011). “Recent Developments in Intergenerational Mobility,” in D. Card and O. Ashenfelter eds, Handbook of Labor Economics. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1487-541.

● 28 September: Neighborhoods, Networks and Assimilation

■ Borjas, Chapter 9

■ Portes, Alejandro and J. Sensenbrenner. 1993. “Embeddedness and Immigration: Notes on the Social Determinants of Economic Action”. American Journal of Sociology, 98(6), pp. 1320-50.

○ Borjas, George J. 1992. “Ethnic Capital and Intergenerational Mobility.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(1), pp. 123-50.

○ Borjas, George J. 1994. “Immigrant Skills and Ethnic Spillovers.” Journal of Population Economics, 7(2), pp. 99-118.

■ Borjas, George J. 1995. “Ethnicity, Neighborhoods, and Human-Capital  Externalities.” American Economic Review, 85(3), pp. 365-90.

■ Lazear, Edward P. 1999. “Culture and Language.” Journal of Political Economy, 107(6), pp. S95-S126.

○ Lazear, Edward P. 2000. “Diversity and Immigration,” In Issues in the Economics of Immigration, ed. G. J. Borjas, 117-42. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER.

○ Kónya, István. 2007 “Optimal Immigration and Cultural Assimilation”. Journal of Labor Economics; 25(2), pp. 367-391.

○ Cutler, David M and Edward L. Glaeser. 1997. “Are Ghettos Good or Bad?Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(3), 827-72.

○ Cutler, David M; Edward L. Glaeser and Jacob Vigdor. 2005. “Ghettos and the Transmission of Ethnic Capital,” in G. C. Loury, T. Modood and S. M. Teles eds, Ethnicity, Social Mobility, and Public Policy: Comparing the USA and UK. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 204-21.

○ Cutler, David M.; Edward L. Glaeser and Jacob L. Vigdor. 2008. “When Are Ghettos Bad? Lessons from Immigrant Segregation in the United States.” Journal of Urban Economics, 63(3), 759-74.

○ Munshi, Kaivan. 2003. “Networks in the Modern Economy: Mexican Migrants in the Us Labor Market.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(2), 549-99.

○ Edin, Per-Anders, Peter Fredriksson, Olof Åslund (2003) “Ethnic enclaves and the economic success of immigrants: evidence from a natural experiment”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(1), pp. 329-357.

○ Chiswick, Barry R. and Paul W. Miller (2005). “Do enclaves matter in immigrant adjustment?City and Community; 4(1), pp. 5-35.

○ Hatton, Timothy J. and Andrew Leigh. 2011. “Immigrants Assimilate as Communities, Not Just as Individuals.” Journal of Population Economics, 24(2), pp. 389-419.

○ Ioannides, Yannis M. and Linda Datcher Loury. 2004. “Job Information Networks, Neighborhood Effects, and Inequality.” Journal of Economic Literature, 42(4), 1056-93.


Midterm: Tuesday, 3 October.

Topic III. Macroeconomics of Migration

● 5 October: Frameworks for analysis, 1: Overview & 1-Sector Models

■ Borjas, Chapter 3

■ Gaston, Noel and Douglas R. Nelson (2013). “Bridging Trade Theory and Labour Econometrics: The Effects of International Migration”. Journal of Economic Surveys, V.27-#1, pp. 98-139.

○ Ruffin, Roy J. 1984. “International Factor Movements,” In Handbook of International Economics, ed. R. W. Jones and P. Kenen, 237-88. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

○ Ethier, Wilfred J. 1986. “International Trade Theory and International Migration,” In Migration, Human Capital and Development, ed. O. Stark, 27-74. Greenwich: JAI Press.

○ Johnson, George 1998. “The Impact of Immigration on Income Distribution among Minorities”. In D. Hamermesh and F. Bean, eds. Help or Hindrance: The Economic Implications of Immigration for African Americans. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, pp. 17-50.

○ MacDougall, G. D. A. 1960. “The Benefits and Costs of Private Investment from Abroad: A Theoretical Approach.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 22(3), pp. 189-211.

○ Kemp, Murray C. 1962. “The Benefits and Costs of Private Investment from Abroad: Comment.” Economic Record, 38(81), pp. 108-10.

● 10 October: Frameworks for analysis, 2: Two Sector Models, 1–Specific Factors

○ Falvey, Rodney E. 1979. “Specific Factors, Comparative Advantage and International Investment: An Extension.” Economica, 46(181), pp. 77-82.

○ Neary, J. Peter. 1989. “Immigration and Real Wages.” Economics Letters, 30(2), pp. 171-74.

○ Neary, J. Peter. 1995. “Factor Mobility and International Trade.” Canadian Journal of Economics, 28(Special Issue), pp. S4-S23.

○ Davies, James and Ian Wooton (1992). “Income Inequality and International Migration”. Economic Journal; V.102-#413, pp. 789-802.

Fall Break: 12-15 October

● 17, 19 October: Frameworks for analysis, 3: Two Sector Models, 2–HOS

○ Rybczynski, T.N. (1955). “Factor Endowments and Relative Commodity Prices”. Economica; V.22-#88, pp. 336-341.

○ Opp, Marcus M.; Hugo F. Sonnenschein and Christis G. Tombazos2009. “Rybczynski’s Theorem in the Heckscher-Ohlin World: Anything Goes.” Journal of International Economics, 79(1), 137-42.

○ Kemp, Murray C. 1966. “Gain from International Trade and Investment: A Neo-Heckscher-Ohlin Approach.” American Economic Review, 56(4), pp. 788-809.

○ Jones, Ronald W. 1967. “International Capital Movements and Theory of Tariffs and Trade.” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 81(1), pp. 1-38.

● 24 October: Frameworks for analysis, 4: Generalization

○ Jones, Ronald W. and Jose Scheinkman. 1977. “Relevance of 2-Sector Production-Model in Trade Theory.” Journal of Political Economy, 85(5), pp. 909-35.

○ Markusen, James R. and Lars E. O. Svensson. 1985. “Trade in Goods and Factors with International Differences in Technology.” International Economic Review, 26(1), pp. 175-92.

○ Ethier, Wilfred J. and Lars E. O. Svensson. 1986. “The Theorems of International Trade with Factor Mobility.” Journal of International Economics, 20(1-2), pp. 21-42.

● Optional topic: Frameworks for analysis, 5: Two Sector models, 3–Networks

○ Deardorff, Alan V. 2001. “Trade and Welfare Implications of Networks”. Journal of Economic Integration, 16(4), pp. 485-99.

○ Schiff, Maurice. 2002. “Love Thy Neighbor: Trade, Migration, and Social Capital”. European Journal of Political Economy, 18(1), pp. 87-107.

● 26 October: Frameworks for analysis, 6: Two Sector models, 4–Extensions

○ Wilson, John D. (1990). “Trade and the Distribution of Economic Well-being in an Economy with Local Public Goods”. Journal of International Economics; V.29-#3/4, pp. 199-215.

Courant and A. Deardorff (1993). “Amenities, Nontraded Goods, and the Trade of Lumpy Countries”. Journal of Urban Economics; V.34-#2, pp. 299-317.

○ Bond, Eric (1993). “Trade, Factor Mobility, and Income Distribution in a Regional Model with Compensating Wage Differentials”. Regional Science and Urban Economics; V.23-#1, pp. 67-84.

○ Krugman, Paul and Anthony Venables (1995). “Globalisation and the Inequality of Nations”. Quarterly Journal of Economics; V.110-#4, pp. 857-880.

● 31 October: Frameworks for analysis, 7: Relationship between trade and migration

■ Mundell, Robert. 1957. “International Trade and Factor Mobility”. American Economic Review, 47(3), pp. 321-35.

■ Markusen, James. 1983. “Factor Movements and Commodity Trade as Complements”. Journal of International Economics, 14(3/4), pp. 341-56.

○ Ethier, Wilfred. 1996. “Theories About Trade Liberalisation and Migration: Substitutes or Complements?”. In International Trade and Migration in the Apec Region, ed. P. J. Lloyd and L. Williams, 50-68.
Melbourne: Oxford University Press.

○ Rauch James. (1991). “Reconciling the Pattern of Trade with the Pattern of Migration”. American Economic Review, 81(3), 775-796.

● Optional Topic: Empirics, 1: Relationship between Trade and Migration

■ Gould, David (1994): “Immigrant Links to the Home Country: Empirical Implications for United States Bilateral Trade Flows”. Review of Economics and Statistics, 76(2), 302-316.

■ Rauch, J. E., and V. Trindade (2002): “Ethnic Chinese Networks in International Trade”. Review of Economics and Statistics, 84(1), 116-130.

■ Egger, Peter H.; Maximilian von Ehrlich and Douglas R. Nelson2012. “Migration and Trade.” The World Economy, 35(2), 216-41.

○ Dunlevy, J. A. (2006): “The Influence of Corruption and Language on the Protrade Effect of Immigrants: Evidence from the American States”. Review of Economics and Statistics, 88(1), 182-186.

○ Iranzo, S., and G. Peri (2009): “Migration and Trade: Theory with an Application to the Eastern–Western European Integration“. Journal of International Economics, 79(1), 1-19.

○ Peri, Giovanni and Francisco Requena-Silvente. 2010. “The Trade Creation Effect of Immigrants: Evidence from the Remarkable Case of Spain.” Canadian Journal of Economics, 43(4), 1433-59.

○ Head, K., and J. Ries (1998): “Immigration and Trade Creation: Econometric Evidence from Canada”. Canadian Journal of Economics, 31(1), 47-62.

○ Collins, W., K. O’Rourke, and J. G. Williamson (1999): “Were Trade and Factor Mobility Substitutes in History?”. in Migration: The Controversies and the Evidence, ed. by R. Faini, J. deMelo, and K. F. Zimmermann. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 227-259.

● 2, 7, 9 & 14 November: Empirics, 2: Labor Market Effects

● Overviews

■ BSZ, Chapter 7

■ Borjas, Chapter 4

○ Borjas, George J.; Richard B. Freeman and Lawrence F. Katz1997. “How Much Do Immigration and Trade Affect Labor Market Outcomes?Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, (1), 1-90.

○ Card, David. 2005. “Is the New Immigration Really So Bad?” Economic Journal, 115(507), F300-F23.

○ Card, David. 2009. “Immigration and Inequality.” American Economic Review, 99(2), 1-21.

○ Okkerse, Liesbet (2008). “How to Measure the Labour Market Effects of Immigration: A Review”. Journal of Economic Surveys; V.22-#1, pp. 1-30.

○ Gaston, Noel and Douglas R. Nelson. 2013. “Bridging Trade Theory and Labour Econometrics: The Effects of International Migration”. Journal of Economic Surveys, 27(1), 98-139.

● Cross-section Methods

■ BSZ, Chapter 8

○ Altonji, Joseph and David Card. 1991. “The Effects of Immigration on the Labor Market Outcomes of Less-Skilled Natives,” in J. M. Abowd and R. B. Freeman eds, Immigration, Trade and Labor Market. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, 201-234.

○ Lalonde, Robert J. and Robert H. Topel. 1991. “Labor Market Adjustments to Increased Migration,” in J. M. Abowd and R. B. Freeman eds, Immigration, Trade and the Labor Market. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, 167-99.

○ Burstein, Ariel; Gordon Hanson; Lin Tian and Jonathan Vogel (2020). “Tradability and the Labor-Market Impact of Immigration: Theory and Evidence from the United States.” Econometrica, V.88-#3, 1071-112.

○ Pischke, Jörn-Steffen and Johannes Velling. 1997. “Employment Effects of Immigration to Germany: An Analysis Based on Local Labor Markets.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 79(4), 594-604.

○ González, Libertad and Francesc Ortega. 2011. “How Do Very Open Economies Adjust to Large Immigration Flows? Evidence from Spanish Regions.” Labour Economics, 18(1), 57-70.

● Natural Experiments

■ Card, David. 1990. “The Impact of the Mariel Boatlift on the Miami Labor-Market”. Industrial & Labor Relations Review, 43(2), pp. 245-57.

Lewis, Ethan (2008). “How Did the Miami Labor Market Absorb the Mariel Immigrants?”. Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper: 04-3.

○ Borjas, George J. (2015). “The Wage Impact of the Marielitos: A Reappraisal,” NBER Working Paper, #21588.

○ Peri, Giovanni and Vasil Yasenov (2015). “The Labor Market Effects of a Refugee Wave: Applying the Synthetic Control Method to the Mariel Boatlift,” NBER Working Paper, #21801. [new version]

○ Friedberg, Rachel (2001). “The Impact of Mass Migration on the Israeli Labor Market”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(4), pp. 1373-408.F302-F31.

○ Kugler, Adriana and Mutlu Yuksel. 2008. “Effects of Low-Skilled Immigration on U.S. Natives: Evidence from Hurricane Mitch”.  NBER Working Paper: 14293.

○ Glitz, Albrecht. 2012. “The Labour Market Impact of Immigration: A Quasi-Experiment Exploiting Immigrant Location Rules in Germany.” Journal of Labor Economics, 30(1), 175-213.

● Native Migratory Response to Immigration

■ Borjas, Chapter 6

○ Borjas, George J.; Richard B. Freeman and Lawrence F. Katz1997. “How Much Do Immigration and Trade Affect Labor Market Outcomes?Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, (1), 1-90. [only 25-38]

○ Card, David. 2001. “Immigrant Inflows, Native Outflows, and the Local Labor Market Impacts of Higher Immigration.” Journal of Labor Economics, 19(1), 22-64.

○ Hatton, Timothy J. and Massimiliano Tani. 2005. “Immigration and Inter-Regional Mobility in the UK, 1982-2000.” Economic Journal, 115(507), F342-F58.

○ Borjas, George J. 2006. “Native Internal Migration and the Labor Market Impact of Immigration.” Journal of Human Resources, 41(2), 221-58.

○ Peri, Giovanni and Chad Sparber. 2011. “Assessing Inherent Model Bias: An Application to Native Displacement in Response to Immigration.” Journal of Urban Economics, 69(1), 82-91.

● Output Adjustment: Rybczynski Effects & Technology Change

○ Hanson, Gordon H. and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2002. “Labor Market Adjustment in Open Economies: Evidence from US States.” Journal of International Economics, 57(1), 3-29.

○ Gandal, Neil; Gordon H. Hanson and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2004. “Technology, Trade, and Adjustment to Immigration in Israel.” European Economic Review, 48(2), 403-28.

○ Lewis, Ethan. 2003. “Local, Open Economies within the US: How Do Industries Resond to Immigration?” Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Working Paper, #04-3.

○ Card, David and Ethan Lewis. 2007. “The Diffusion of Mexican Immigrants During the 1990s: Explanation and Impacts,” in G. J. Borjas ed Mexican Immigration to the United States. Chicago: University of Chicago Press/NBER, 193-277. [esp. 210-225]

○ Dustmann, Christian and Albrecht Glitz. 2011. “How Do Industries and Firms Respond to Changes in Local Labor Supply?” IZA Discussion Paper, #6257.

○ Blanes, José Vicente; Francisco Requena and Guadalupe Serrano. 2011. “Labour Market Adjustment in the Spanish Regions: A First Examination to the Immigration Shock, 1995-2002.” Working Papers in Applied Economics, #1123.

○ González, Libertad and Francesc Ortega. 2011. “How Do Very Open Economies Adjust to Large Immigration Flows? Evidence from Spanish Regions.” Labour Economics, 18(1), 57-70.

● Optional topic: Are Immigrants and Natives Perfect Substitutes?

■ Chiswick, Barry R.; Carmel U. Chiswick and Paul W. Miller. 1985. “Are Immigrants and Natives Perfect Substitutes in Production”. International Migration Review, 19(4), pp. 674-85.

■ Greenwood, Michael J.; Gary L. Hunt and Ulrich Kohli. 1997. “The Factor-Market Consequences of Unskilled Immigration to the United States”. Labor Economics, 4(1), pp. 1-28.

■ Borjas, George (2003). “The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), pp. 1335-74. [pp. 1354-1359]

■ Ottaviano, Gianmarco I. P. and Giovanni Peri. 2012. “Rethinking the Effect of Immigration on Wages.” Journal of the European Economic Association, 10(1), 152-97 (esp. 152-184).

○ Manacorda, Marco; Alan Manning and Jonathan Wadsworth. 2012. “The Impact of Immigration on the Structure of Wages: Theory and Evidence from Britain.” Journal of the European Economic Association, 10(1), 120-51 (esp. 120-142).

○ Borjas, George J.; Jeffrey Grogger and Gordon H. Hanson. 2012. “Comment: On Estimating Elasticities of Substition.” Journal of the European Economic Association, 10(1), 198-210.

○ Dustmann, Christian and Ian Preston. 2012. “Comment: Estimating the Effect of Immigration on Wages.” Journal of the European Economic Association, 10(1), 216-23.

○ Grossman, Jean (1982). “The Substitutability of Natives and Immigrants in Production.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 64(4), pp. 596-603.

○ Tombazos, Christis G & Jaai Parasnis. 2003. “On Applications of Duality to the Study of Immigration.” Economic Papers, 22(1), pp. 46-57.

○ Peri, Giovanni and Chad Sparber. 2009. “Task Specialization, Immigration and Wages.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 1(3), 135-69.

○ Peri, Giovanni and Chad Sparber. 2011. “Highly Educated Immigrants and Native Occupational Choice.” Industrial Relations, 50(3), 385-411.

○ Peri, Giovanni. 2011. “Rethinking the Area Approach: Immigrants and the Labor Market in California, 1960-2005.” Journal of International Economics, 84(1), 1-14.

○ Borjas, George J.; Jeffrey Grogger and Gordon H. Hanson. 2008. “Imperfect Substitution between Immigrants and Natives: A Reappraisal.” NBER Working Paper: #13887.

● Economy-wide Estimation

■ Borjas, Chapter 5

■ Borjas, George (2003). “The Labor Demand Curve Is Downward Sloping: Reexamining the Impact of Immigration on the Labor Market”. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 118(4), pp. 1335-74.

■ Ottaviano, Gianmarco I. P. and Giovanni Peri. 2012. “Rethinking the Effect of Immigration on Wages.” Journal of the European Economic Association, 10(1), 152-97 (esp. 185-197).F359-F76

○ Manacorda, Marco; Alan Manning and Jonathan Wadsworth. 2012. “The Impact of Immigration on the Structure of Wages: Theory and Evidence from Britain.” Journal of the European Economic Association, 10(1), 120-51 (esp. 143-151).

○ D’Amuri, Francesco; Gianmarco Ottaviano and Giovanni Peri. 2010. “The Labor Market Impact of Immigration in Western Germany in the 1990’s”. European Economic Review, V.54-#4, pp. 550-570.

○ Felbermayr, Gabriel; Wido Geis and Wilhelm Kohler. 2010. “Restrictive Immigration Policy in Germany: Pains and Gains Foregone?Review of World Economics, 146(1), 1-21.

○ Brücker, Herbert and Elke J. Jahn. 2011. “Migration and Wage-Setting: Reassessing the Labor Market Effects of Migration.” Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 113(2), 286-317.

○ Ruist, Joakim and Arne Bigsten. 2013. “Wage Effects of Labour Migration with International Capital Mobility.” The World Economy, 36(1), 31-47.

○ Cohen, Sarit and Chang-Tai Hsieh. 2001. “Macroeconomic and Labor Market Impact of Russian Immigration to Israel.” ms: Bar-Ilan University. [also see Chapter 2 of S. Cohen-Goldner, Z. Eckstein and Y. Weiss, 2012. Immigration and Labor Market Mobility in Israel, 1990-2009. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 14-40.]

● Other Approaches

○ Angrist, Joshua D. and Adriana D. Kugler. 2003. “Protective or Counter-Productive? Labour Market Institutions and the Effect of Immigration on EU Natives.” Economic Journal, 113(488), pp.

○ Saiz, Albert. 2003. “Room in the Kitchen for the Melting Pot: Immigration and Rental Prices.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 85(3), pp. 502-21.

○ Lach, Saul. 2007. “Immigration and Prices.” Journal of Political Economy, 115(4), 548-87.

○ Cortes, Patricia. 2008. “The Effect of Low-Skilled Immigration on U. S. Prices: Evidence from Cpi Data.” Journal of Political Economy, 116(3), 381-422.

○ Bodvarsson, Örn B.; Hendrik Van den Berg and Joshua J. Lewer (2008). “Measuring Immigration’s Effects on Labor Demand: A Reexamination of the Mariel Boatlift.” Labour Economics, 15(4), pp. 560-74..

○ Frijters, Paul; Michael A. Shields and Stephen W. Price. 2005. “Job Search Methods and Their Success: A Comparison of Immigrants and Natives in the UK”. Economic Journal, 115(507), pp.

○ Mishra, Prachi. 2007. “Emigration and Wages in Source Countries: Evidence from Mexico.” Journal of Development Economics, 82(1), pp. 180-99.

○ Federman, Maya N.; David E. Harrington and Kathy Krynski2006. “Vietnamese Manicurists: Are Immigrants Displacing Natives or Finding New Nails to Polish?Industrial & Labor Relations Review, 59(2), 302-18.

Topic IV. Welfare Economics of Migration

● 16 November: Philosophical issues in the welfare economics of migration

■ Sidgwick, Henry. 1891. “Principles of External Policy,” In The Elements of Politics, 285-315. London: Macmillan.

■ Walzer, Michael (1981). “The Distribution of Membership”. in Peter Brown and Henry Shue, eds. Boundaries: National Autonomy and Its Limits. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, pp. 1-35.

■ Carens, Joseph (1987). “Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders”. Review of Politics; V.49-#2, pp. 251-273.

○ Zolberg, Aristide (1987). “Keeping Them Out: Ethical Dilemmas of Immigration Policy”. in R. Myers, ed. International Ethics in the Nuclear Age. Washington, DC: University Press of America, pp. 262-297.

● 21 November: Global welfare economics of migration: theory

■ Wong, Kar-Yiu. 1986. “The Economic Analysis of International Migration: A Generalization.” The Canadian Journal of Economics, 19(2), 357-62.

■ Quibria, M. G. 1988. “On Generalizing the Economic Analysis of International Migration: A Note.” Canadian Journal of Economics, 21(4), 874-76.

■ Tu, Pierre N.V. (1991). “Migration: Gains or Losses”. Economic Record; V.167(197), 153-157.

■ Kemp, Murray (1993). “The Welfare Gains from International Migration”. Keio Economic Studies; V.30(1), 1-5.

■ Hammond, Peter J. and Jaume Sempere, 2006. “Gains from Trade versus Gains from Migration: What Makes Them So Different?,” Journal of Public Economic Theory;V.8-#1, pp. 145-170.

○ Travis, William P. (1982). “Migration, Income Distribution, and Welfare under Alternative International Economic Policies”. Law and Contemporary Problems; V.45-#2, pp. 81-106.

○ Sykes, Alan O. “The Welfare Economics of Immigration Law: A Theoretical Survey with an Analysis of U.S. Policy”. In Warren Schwartz, ed. (1995). Justice in Immigration. Cambridge: CUP, pp. 158-200.

○ G. Grossman (1984). “The Gains from International Factor Movements”. Journal of International Economics; V.17-#1/2, pp. 73-83.

○ R. Brecher and E. Choudhri (1990). “Gains from International Factor Movements without Lump-Sum Compensation: Taxation by Location versus Nationality”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.23-#1, pp. 44-59.

○ Clarke, Harry R. (1995). “International Labor-cum-Capital Migrations: Theory, Welfare Implications, and Evidence”. Open Economies Review; V.6-#4, pp. 323-340.

○ Clarke, Harry R. (1995). “Some Welfare Implications of Birth, Death, and Migration”. International Advances in Economic Research; V.1-#3, pp. 242-250.

○ V. Meier and A. Wenig (1997). “Welfare Implications of International Labor Migration”. Zeitschrift fur Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften; V.117-#4, pp. 505-524.

○ Hammond, Peter J. and Jaume Sempere. 2009. “Migration with Local Public Goods and the Gains from Changing Places.” Economic Theory, 41(3), pp. 359-77.

○ Findlay, Ronald (1982). “International Distributive Justice”. Journal of International Economics; V.13-#1/2, pp. 1-14.

○ M. Quibria (1990). “On International Migration and the Social Welfare Function”. Bulletin of Economic Research; V.42-#2, pp. 141-152.

○ Roemer, John E. 2006. “The Global Welfare Economics of Immigration.” Social Choice and Welfare, 27(2), pp. 311-25.

○ Mountford, Andrew and Hillel Rapoport. 2011. “The Brain Drain and the World Distribution of Income.” Journal of Development Economics, 95(1), 4-17.

Thanksgiving Break: 22-26 November

● 28 November: Measuring Welfare Effects of Migration: Global Welfare

■ Hamilton, Bob and John Whalley. 1984. “Efficiency and Distributional Implications of Global Restrictions on Labour Mobility: Calculations and Policy Implications.” Journal of Development Economics, 14(1-2), pp. 61-75.

■ Moses, Jonathon W. and Bjørn Letnes. 2004. “The Economic Costs to International Labor Restrictions: Revisiting the Empirical Discussion.” World Development, 32(10), pp. 1609-1626.

■ Walmsley, Terrie L.; Alan Winters and Amer Ahmed. 2011. “The Impact of the Movement of Labour: Results from a Model of Bilateral Migration Flows.” Global Economy Journal, 11(4).

○ Iregui, Ana Maria. 2005. “Efficiency Gains from the Elimination of Global Restrictions on Labour Mobility: An Analysis Using a Multiregional CGE Model,” In Poverty, International Migration and Asylum, ed. G. J. Borjas and J. Crisp, 211-238. New York: Palgrave Macmillan/UN-WIDER.

○ Kapur, D. and J. McHale. 2009. “International Migration and the World Income Distribution.” Journal of International Development, 21(8), pp. 1102-10.

○ Walmsley, Terrie L. and L. Alan Winters. 2005. “Relaxing the Restrictions on the Temporary Movement of Natural Persons: A Simulation Analysis.” Journal of Economic Integration, 20(4), pp. 688-726.

○ Klein, Paul and Gustavo Ventura. 2009. “Productivity Differences and the Dynamic Effects of Labor Movements.” Journal of Monetary Economics, 56(8), 1059-73.

○ Benhabib, Jess and Boyan Jovanovic. 2012. “Optimal Migration: A World Perspective.International Economic Review, 53(2), 321-48.

● 30 November: Measuring Welfare Effects of Migration: Host Country Welfare

■ Borjas, Chapter 7 & 8

■ Borjas, George J. 1995. “The Economic Benefits from Immigration.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 9(2), 3-22.

■ Chojnicki, Xavier; Frédéric Docquier and Lionel Ragot. 2011. “Should the U.S. Have Locked the Heaven’s Door? Reassessing the Benefits of the Postwar Immigration”. Journal of Population Economics, 24(1), pp. 317-359.

○ Dustmann, Christian and Ian P. Preston. 2006. “Is Immigration Good or Bad for the Economy? Analysis of Attitudinal Responses.” Economics of Immigration and Social Diversity, 24, pp. 3-34.

○ Felbermayr, Gabriel J. and Wilfred Kohler. 2007. “Immigration and Native Welfare.” International Economic Review, 48(3), 731-60.

○ Kemnitz, Alexander. 2009. “Native Welfare Losses from High Skilled Immigration.” International Tax and Public Finance, 16(4), pp. 560-570.

○ Kremer, Michael and Stanley Watt. 2006. “The Globalization of Household Production.” Weatherhead Center for International Affairs (Harvard University), Working Paper # 2008-0086.

● 5 December: Welfare Effects and the Source Country: Imigration, Remittances, and the Brain Drain

■ BSZ, Chapter 11

■ Berry, R. Albert and Ronald Soligo. 1969. “Some Welfare Aspects of International Migration.” Journal of Political Economy, 77(5), pp. 778-794.

○ Kenen, Peter B. 1971. “Migration, the Terms of Trade, and Economic Welfare in the Source Country,” in J. Bhagwati, R. W.Jones, R. A. Mundell and J. Vanek eds, Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth: Papers in International Economics in Honor of Charles P. Kindleberger. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 238-60.

■ Bhagwati, Jagdish and Carlos Rodriguez. 1975. “Welfare-Theoretical Analyses of the Brain Drain.” Journal of Development Economics, 2(3), pp. 195-221.

○ Commander, Simon; Mari Kangasniemi and L. Alan Winters. 2004. “The Brain Drain: A Review of Theory and Facts.” Brussels Economic Review/Cahiers Economiques de Bruxelles, 47(1), pp. 29-44.

○ Marchiori, Luca; I. Ling Shen and Frédéric Docquier. 2013. “Brain Drain in Globalization: A General Equilibrium Analysis from theSending Countries’ Perspective.” Economic Inquiry, 51(2), 1582-602.

○ Cinar, Dilek and Frédéric Docquier. 2004. “Brain Drain and Remittances: Implications for the Source Country.” Brussels Economic Review/Cahiers Economiques de Bruxelles, 47(1), pp. 103-18.

○ Docquier, Frédéric; Olivier Lohest and Abdeslam Marfouk. 2006. “Brain Drain in Developing Countries.” World Bank Economic Review, 21(2), pp. 193-218.

○ Rapoport, Hillel and Frédéric Docquier. 2006. “The Economics of Migrants’ Remittances,” In Handbook on the Economics of Giving, Reciprocity and Altruism, ed. S.-C. Kolm and J. M. Ythier, 1135-98. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

○ Docquier, Frédéric and Hillel Rapoport. 2012. “Globalization, Brain Drain, and Development.” Journal of Economic Literature, 50(3), 681-730.

○ McKenzie, David, John Gibson and Steven Stillman. 2010, “How Important is Selection? Experimental vs Non-experimental Measures of the Income Gains from Migration,” Journal of the European Economic Association, V.8-#4, pp. 913-945.

○ Gibson, John; David McKenzie and Steven Stillman. 2010. “The Impacts of International Migration on Remaining Household Members: Omnibus Results from a Migration Lottery Program.” Review of Economics and Statistics, 93(4), 1297-318.

○ Gibson, John and David McKenzie. 2011. “Eight Questions About Brain Drain.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(3), 107-28.

○ Yang, Dean. 2011. “Migrant Remittances.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 25(3), 129-52.

Topic 5. Policy (Optional Topic)

● Welfare State Policy and Migration Pattern

■ Zavodny, Madeline (1997). “Welfare and the Locational Choices of New Immigrants”. Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas Economic Review; Second Quarter, pp. 2-10.

■ Borjas, George J. 1999. “Immigration and Welfare Magnets”. Journal of Labor Economics, 17(4), pp. 607-37.

○ Nannestad, Peter (2001). “Immigration and welfare states: A survey of 15 years of research”. European Journal of Political Economy; 23(2), pp. 512-532.

○ Borjas, George J. 2002. “Welfare Reform and Immigrant Participation in Welfare Programs”. International Migration Review, 36(4), pp. 1093-123.

○ Borjas, George J. and Stephen Trejo. 1991. “Immigrant Participation in the Welfare System”. Industrial & Labor Relations Review, 44(2), pp. 195-211.

○ Levine, Phillip B. and David J. Zimmerman (1999), “An Empirical Analysis of the Welfare Magnet Debate Using the NLSY”. Journal of Population Economics, 12(3), 391.

○ Kennan, John and James R. Walker (2010). “Wages, welfare benefits and migration”. Journal of Econometrics; 156(1), 229-238.

○ Cohen, Alon and Assaf Razin (2008). “The Skill Composition of Immigrants and the Generosity of the Welfare State: Free vs. Policy-Controlled Migration”. NBER Working Paper, #14459.

● Fiscal Effects of Immigration

■ BSZ, Chapter 10

○ MaCurdy, Thomas; Thomas Nechyba and Jay Bhattacharaya. 1998. “An Economic Framework for Assessing the Fiscal Impacts of Immigration,” In The Immigration Debate: Studies on the Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration, ed. J. P. Smith and B. Edmonston, 13-65. Washington, DC: National Academy Press.

■ Espenshade, Thomas J. 1994. “Can Immigration Slow United States Population Aging.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 13(4), pp. 759-68.

○ Bonin, Holger; Bernd Raffelhüschen and Jan Walliser. 2000. “Can Immigration Alleviate the Demographic Burden?FinanzArchiv, 57(1), pp. 1-21.

■ Preston, Ian. (2014). “The Effect of Immigration on Public Finances.” The Economic Journal, V.124-#580, F569-F92.

■ Lee, Ronald D. and Timothy W. Miller. 2000. “Immigration, Social Security, and Broader Fiscal Impacts.” American Economic Review, 90(2), pp. 350-54.

○ Auerbach, Alan J. and Philip Oreopoulos. 2000. “The Fiscal Effect of U S Immigration: A Generational Accounting Perspective,” In Tax Policy and the Economy, ed. J. M. Poterba, 123-56. Cambridge: MIT Press/NBER.

○ Storesletten, Kjetil. 2000. “Sustaining Fiscal Policy through Immigration.” Journal of Political Economy, 108(2), pp. 300-23.

○ Dustmann, Christian; Tommaso Frattini and Caroline Halls. 2010. “Assessing the Fiscal Costs and Benefits of A8 Migration to the UK.” Fiscal Studies, 31(1), pp. 1-41.

○ Kemnitz, Alexander. 2008. “Can Immigrant Employment Alleviate the Demographic Burden? The Role of Union Centralization.” Economics Letters, 99(1), pp. 123-26.

○ Dustmann, Christian and Tommaso Frattini. (2014). “The Fiscal Effects of Immigration to the UK.” The Economic Journal, V.124-#580, F593-F643.

● Illegal Immigration

■ Hanson, Gordon H. 2006. “Illegal Migration from Mexico to the United States.” Journal of Economic Literature, 44(4), pp. 869-924.

○ Espenshade, Thomas J. 1995. “Unauthorized Immigration to the United States.” Annual Review of Sociology, 21, pp. 195-216.

○ Jasso, Guillermina; Douglas S. Massey; Mark R. Rosenzweig and James P. Smith. 2008. “From Illegal to Legal: Estimating Previous Illegal Experience among New Legal Immigrants to the United States.” International Migration Review, 42(4), pp. 803-43.

○ Ethier, Wilfred J. 1986. “Illegal Immigration: The Host Country Problem.” American Economic Review, 76(1), pp. 56-71.

○ Bond, Eric W. and Tain-Jy Chen. 1987. “The Welfare Effects of Illegal Immigration.” Journal of International Economics, 23(3-4), pp. 315-28.

● Quotas and Border Enforcement

Mayda, Anna Maria. 2008. “International Migration: A Panel Data Analysis of the Determinants of Bilateral Flows”. Journal of Population Economics, 23(4), 1249-74.

○ Bertocchi, Graziella and Chiara Strozzi. 2008. “International Migration and the Role of Institutions.” Public Choice, 137(1-2), pp. 81-102.

○ Bertocchi, Graziella and Chiara Strozzi. 2010. “The Evolution of Citizenship: Economic and Institutional Determinants.” Journal of Law & Economics, 53(1), pp. 95-136.

○ Jasso, Guillermina and Mark R. Rosenzweig. 1983. “United States Immigration Law and Immigrant Behavior: A Longitudinal Analysis.” Population Index, 49(3), pp. 359-59.

○ Espenshade, Thomas J. 1994. “Does the Threat of Border Apprehension Deter Undocumented United-States Immigration.” Population and Development Review, 20(4), pp. 871-92.

○ Hanson, Gordon H. and Antonio Spilimbergo. 1999. “Illegal Immigration, Border Enforcement, and Relative Wages: Evidence from Apprehensions at the US-Mexico Border.” American Economic Review, 89(5), pp. 1337-57.

■ Hanson, Gordon H.; Raymond Robertson and Antonio Spilimbergo. 2002. “Does Border Enforcement Protect US Workers from Illegal Immigration?Review of Economics and Statistics, 84(1), pp. 73-92.

○ Miller, P. W. 1999. “Immigration Policy and Immigrant Quality: The Australian Points System.” American Economic Review, 89(2), pp. 192-97.

■ Orrenius, Pia M. and Madeline Zavodny. 2003. “Do Amnesty Programs Reduce Undocumented Immigration? Evidence from IRCA.” Demography, 40(3), pp. 437-50.

■ Orrenius, Pia M. and Madeline Zavodny. 2009. “The Effects of Tougher Enforcement on the Job Prospects of Recent Latin American Immigrants.” Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 28(2), pp.

● Refugees and Asylum

■ Hatton, Timothy J.; W. F. Richter and Riccardo Faini. 2004. “Seeking Asylum in Europe.” Economic Policy, (38), pp. 5-62.

■ Hatton, Timothy J. 2009. “The Rise and Fall of Asylum: What Happened and Why?Economic Journal, 119(535), pp. F183-F213.

■ Ruist, Joakim. (2015). “The Fiscal Cost of Refugee Immigration: The Example of Sweden.” Population and Development Review, V.41-#4, 567-81.

UNHCR Global Trends 2016. New York: UNHCR.

○ Chin, Aimee and Kalena E. Cortes (2015). “The Refugee/Asylum Seeker,” in P. W. Miller ed Handbook of the Economics of International Migration. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 585-658.

○ Stark, Oded. 2004. “On the Economics of Refugee Flows.” Review of Development Economics, 8(2), pp. 325-29.

○ Facchini, Giovanni; O. Lorz and Gerald Willmann. 2006. “Asylum Seekers in Europe: The Warm Glow of a Hot Potato.” Journal of Population Economics, 19(2), pp. 411-30.

Topic VI. Political Economy [optional topic]

● Explaining public preferences on immigration

○ Hainmueller, Jens and Daniel J. Hopkins (2014). “Public Attitudes toward Immigration”. Annual Review of Political Science; V.17, pp. 225-249.

○ Scheve, Kenneth and Matthew Slaughter (2001). “Labor Market Competition and Individual Preferences of Immigration Policy”. Review of Economics and Statistics; 83(1), 133-145.

○ I. Gang, F. Rivera-Batiz and M. Yun (2002). “Economic Strain, Ethnic Concentration and Attitudes Towards Foreigners in the European Union”. Review of International Economics, V21-#2, pp. 177-190.

○ K. O’Rourke and R. Sinnott (2006). “The Determinants of Individual Attitudes Toward Immigration”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.22-#4, pp. 838-861.

○ A.M. Mayda (2006). “Who is Against Immigration? A Cross-Country Investigation of Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants”. Review of Economics and Statistics; V.88-#3, pp. 510-530.

■ Facchini, Giovanni and Anna Maria Mayda (2008). “From individual attitudes towards migrants to migration policy outcomes: Theory and Evidence”, Economic Policy, 56, pp. 651 – 713. [esp. 651-684]

■ Giovanni Facchini and Anna Maria Mayda (2009). “Does the Welfare State Affect Individual Attitudes toward Immigrants? Evidence across Countries,” Review of Economics and Statistics, 91(2), 295-314.

○ Giovanni, Facchini and Mayda Anna Maria (2010). “What Drives Immigration Policy? Evidence Based on a Survey of Governments’ Officials,” in G. S. Epstein and I. Gang eds, Migration and Culture. Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 605-48.

○ Jens Hainmueller and Michael Hiscox (2007). “Educated Preferences: Explaining Individual Attitudes Toward Immigration in Europe”. International Organization, V.61-#2: pp. 399-442.

■ Hainmueller, Jens and Michael J. Hiscox (2008). “Attitudes Towards Highly Skilled and Low Skilled Immigration: Evidence from a Survey Experiment”. American Political Science Review; V.104-#1, pp. 61-84.

■ Helbling, Marc and Hanspeter Kriesi. (2014). “Why Citizens Prefer High- over Low-Skilled Immigrants. Labor Market Competition, Welfare State, and Deservingness.” European Sociological Review, V.30-#5, 595-614.

○ Hainmueller, Jens; Daniel J. Hopkins and Teppei Yamamoto(2014). “Causal Inference in Conjoint Analysis: Understanding Multidimensional Choices Via Stated Preference Experiments.” Political Analysis, V.22-#1, 1-30.

○ Hainmueller, Jens and Daniel J. Hopkins (2012). “The Hidden American Immigration Consensus: A Conjoint Analysis of Attitudes toward Immigrants”. MIT Political Science Department Working Paper #2012-22.

○ Wright, Matthew, Morris Levy and Jack Citrin (2014). “Conflict and Consensus on American Public Opinion on Illegal Immigration”. American University–School of Public Affairs working paper, #2014-0006.

○ Ortega, Francesc and Javier G. Polavieja (2009). “Labor-market Exposure as a Determinant of Attitudes toward Immigration”. Labour Economics, 19(3), 298-311.

● Social/Cultural Bases for Migration Preferences

○ Citrin, Jack, Donald Green, Christopher Muste and Cara Wong (1997). “Public Opinion Toward Immigration Reform: The Role of Economic Motivations”. Journal of Politics; 59(2), 858-881.

○ Sniderman, Paul, Louk Hagendoorn and Markus Prior (2004). “Predisposing Factors and Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to Immigrant Minorities”. American Political Science Review; 98(1), 35-49.

○Sides, John and Jack Citrin (2007). “European Opinion About Immigration: The Role of Identities, Interests and Information”. British Journal of Political Science; 37(), 477-504.

○ Citrin, Jack; Amy Lerman; Michael Murakami and Kathryn Pearson. (2007). “Testing Huntington: Is Hispanic Immigration a Threat to American Identity?Perspectives on Politics, V.5-#01, 31-48.

○ Citrin, Jack and John Sides. (2008). “Immigration and the Imagined Community in Europe and the United States.” Political Studies, V.56-#1, 33-56.

○ Dustmann, Christian and Ian Preston (2007). “Racial and Economic Factors in Attitudes Toward Immigration”. B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 7(1).

○ Dustmann, Christian; Francesca Fabbri and Ian Preston. (2011). “Racial Harassment, Ethnic Concentration, and Economic Conditions.” The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, V.113-#3, 689-711.

○ Card, David; Christian Dustmann and Ian Preston. 2012. “Immigration, Wages, and Compositional Amenities.” Journal of the European Economic Association, 10(1), 78-119.

○ Brader, Ted; Nicholas A. Valentino and Elizabeth Suhay. (2008). “What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat.” American Journal of Political Science, V.52-#4, 959-78.

○ Hopkins, Daniel (2010). “Politicized Places: Explaining Where and When Immigrants Provoke Local Opposition”. American Political Science Review; 104(1), 40-60.

○ Hopkins, Daniel J. (2011). “National Debates, Local Responses: The Origins of Local Concern About Immigration in Britain and the United States.” British Journal of Political Science, V.41-#03, 499-524.

○ Hopkins, Daniel J. (2014). “The Upside of Accents: Language, Inter-Group Difference, and Attitudes toward Immigration.” British Journal of Political Science, V.FirstView, 1-27.

○ Branton, Regina, Erin Cassese, Bradford Jones and Chad Westerland (2011). “All Along the Watchtower: Acculturation Fear, Anti-Latino Affect, and Immigration”. Journal of Politics; 73(3), 664-679.

● Labor market effects and political economy, 1: Referendum

■ Benhabib, J., 1996. “On the political economy of immigration”. European Economic Review 40, 1737-1743.

○ J.-M. Grether, J. deMelo, and T. Muller (2001). “The Political Economy of Migration in a Ricardo-Viner Model”. In S. Djajic, ed. International Migration: Trends, Policy, Impact. London: Routledge, pp. 42-68.

○ Mayer, W., 2010. From individual to social immigration preferences. ms: University of Cincinnati.

○ Magris, Francesco and Giuseppe Russo (2005). “Voting on Mass Immigration Restriction”. Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Sociali, V.113-#1, pp. 67-92.

○ Russo, Giuseppe (2011). “Voting over Selective Immigration Policies with Immigration Aversion”. Economics of Governance, V.12-#4, pp. 325-51.

○ Llavador, Humberto and Angel Solano-García (2011). “Immigration Policy with Partisan Parties”. Journal of Public Economics, V.95-#1–2, pp. 134-42.

○ Florence Miguet (2008). “Voting About Immigration Policy: What Does the Swiss Experience Tell Us?”. European Journal of Political Economy; V.24-#3, pp. 628-641.

○ Sciarini, Pascal and Anke Tresch. (2009). “A Two-Level Analysis of the Determinants of Direct Democratic Choices in European, Immigration and Foreign Policy in Switzerland.” European Union Politics, V.10-#4, 456-81.

○ Krishnakumar, Jaya and Tobias Müller (2012). “The Political Economy of Immigration in a Direct Democracy: The Case of Switzerland”. European Economic Review, V.56-#2, pp. 174-89.

○ Goldin, Claudia (1994). “The Political Economy of Immigration Restriction in the US”. In C. Goldin and G. Liebcap eds, The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 223-57.

○ Timmer, A. S. and Jeffrey G. Williamson (1998). “Immigration Policy Prior to the 1930s: Labor Markets, Policy Interactions, and Globalization Backlash”. Population and Development Review, V.24-#4, pp. 739-71.

○ McCarty, Nolan M.; Keith T. Poole and Howard Rosenthal (2006). “Immigration, Income and the Voters’ Incentive to Redistribute”. Chapter 4 in Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, pp. 115-38.

○ Facchini, Giovanni and Max Friedrich Steinhardt (2011). “What Drives U.S. Immigration Policy? Evidence from Congressional Roll Call Votes”. Journal of Public Economics, V.95-#7–8, pp. 734-43.

● Labor market effects and political economy, 2: Lobbying

■ Facchini, Giovanni and Gerald Willmann (2005). “The Political Economy of International Factor Mobility”. Journal of International Economics; V.67-#1, pp. 201-219.

■ Facchini, Giovanni and Anna Maria Mayda (2008). “From individual attitudes towards migrants to migration policy outcomes: Theory and Evidence”, Economic Policy, 56, pp. 651 – 713. [esp. 684-697]

■ Facchini, Giovanni; Anna Maria Mayda and Prachi Mishra (2008). “Do Interest Groups Affect US Immigration Policy?”. Journal of International Economics; V.85-#?, pp. 114-128.

○ Kerr, William R.; William Lincoln and Prachi Mishra (2011). “The Dynamics of Firm Lobbying”. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy; V6-#4, pp. 343-379.

○ Epstein, Gil S. and Shmuel Nitzan (2006). “The Struggle over Migration Policy”. Journal of Population Economics, V.19-#4, pp. 703-23.

○ Bodvarsson, Orn B.; William H. Kaempfer; Anton D. Lowenberg and William Mertens (2007). “The Political Market for Immigration Restrictions: Model and Test”. Journal of International Trade and Economic Development, V.16-#2, pp. 159-92.

○ Amegashi, J. Atsu (2004). “A Political Economy of Immigration Quotas”. Economics of Governance, V.5-#3, pp. 255-67.

○ Giorgio Bellettini and Carlotta Berti Ceroni (2008). “Can Unions Hurt Workers Workers?: A Positive Analysis of Immigration Policy”. Economics and Politics, V.20-#1, pp. 106-124.

● Welfare states and political economy

■ A. Razin, E. Sadka, and P. Swagel (2002). “Tax Burden and Migration: A Political-Economy Theory and Evidence”. Journal of Public Economics; V.85-#2, pp. 167-190.

○ Scholten, Ulrich and Marcel Thum (1996). “Public Pensions and Immigration Policy in a Democracy”. Public Choice, V.87-#3-4, pp. 347-61.

○ G. Epstein and L. Hillman (2003). “Unemployed Immigrants and Voter Sentiment in the Welfare State”. Journal of Public Economics; V.87-#7/8, pp. 1641-1655.

○ J. Dolmas and G. Huffman (2004). “On the Political Economy of Immigration and Income Redistribution”. International Economic Review; V.45-#4, pp. 1129-1168.

○ Hansen, Jørgen Drud (2003). “Immigration and Income Redistribution in Welfare States”. European Journal of Political Economy, V.19-#4, pp. 735-46.

○ M. Gradstein and M. Schiff (2004). “The Political Economy of Social Exclusion, with Implications for Immigration Policy”. Journal of Population Economics; V.19-#2, pp. 327-344.

○ Mayr, Karin (2007). “Immigration and Income Redistribution: A Political Economy Analysis”. Public Choice, V.131-#1-2, pp. 101-16.

○ Ortega, Francesc (2010). “Immigration, Citizenship, and the Size of Government”. The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, V.10-#1, pp. Article 26.

○ Roemer, John E.; Woojin Lee and Karine Van der Straeten (2007). Racism, Xenophobia, and Distribution: Multi-Issue Politics in Advanced Democracies. New York: Harvard University Press\Russell Sage foundation.

○ Kessler, Anke S.; Christoph Lulfesmann and Gordon M. Myers (2002). “Redistribution, Fiscal Competition, and the Politics of Economic Integration”. Review of Economic Studies, V.69-#4, pp. 899-923.

○ Hanson, Gordon H.; Kenneth Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter(2007). “Public Finance and Individual Preferences over Globalization Strategies.” Economics & Politics, V.19-#1, 1-33.

○ Burgoon, Brian; Ferry Koster and Marcel van Egmond. (2012). “Support for Redistribution and the Paradox of Immigration.” Journal of European Social Policy, V.22-#3, 288-304.

○ Burgoon, Brian. (2014). “Immigration, Integration, and Support for Redistribution in Europe.” World Politics, V.66-#03, 365-405.

○ Tiebout, Charles M. (1956). “A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures”. Journal of Political Economy, V.64-#5, pp. 416-24.

○ Bewley, Truman F. (1981). “A Critique of Tiebout’s Theory of Local Public Expenditures.” Econometrica, V.49-#3, 713-40.

○ Epple, Dennis and Thomas Romer (1991). “Mobility and Redistribution”. Journal of Political Economy, V.99-#4, pp. 828-58.

○ Epple, Dennis; Thomas Romer and Holger Sieg (2001). “Interjurisdictional Sorting and Majority Rule: An Empirical Analysis”. Econometrica, V.69-#6, pp. 1437-65.

○ Ross, Stephen and John Yinger (1999). “Sorting and Voting: A Review of the Literature on Urban Public Finance”. In P. Cheshire and E. S. Mills eds, Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics. Volume 3. Applied Urban Economics, Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp.

○ Bolton, Patrick and Gérard Roland (1996). “Distributional Conflicts, Factor Mobility, and Political Integration”. The American Economic Review, V.86-#2, pp. 99-104.

○ Bolton, Patrick and Gérard Roland (1997). “The Breakup of Nations: A Political Economy Analysis”. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, V.112-#4, pp. 1057-90.

○ Perotti, Roberto (2001). “Is a Uniform Social Policy Better? Fiscal Federalism and Factor Mobility”. The American Economic Review, V.91-#3, pp. 596-610.

● A real referendum: California’s prop. 187

■ C. Tolbert and R. Hero (1996). “Race/Ethnicity and Direct Democracy: An Analysis of California’s Illegal Immigration Initiative”. Journal of Politics; V.58-#3, pp. 806-818.

○ C. Tolbert and R. Hero (1996). “A Racial/Ethnic Diversity Interpretation of Politics and Policy in the States of the US”. American Journal of Political Science; V.40-#3, pp. 851-871.

○ Calavita, Kitty (1996). “The New Politics of Immigration: ‘Balanced-Budget Conservatism’ and the Symbolism of Proposition 187”. Social Problems, V.43-#3, pp. 284-305.

○ K. MacDonald and B. Cain (1997). “Nativism, Partisanship and Immigration: An Analysis of Prop. 187″. in M. Preston, B. Cain, and S. Bass, eds. Racial and Ethnic Politics in California. Berkeley: Institute for Governmental Studies.

■ R.M. Alvarez and T. Butterfield (2000). “The Resurgence of Nativism in California? The Case of Prop. 187 and Illegal Immigration”. Social Science Quarterly, V.81-#1, pp. 167-179.

○ L. Newton (2000). “Why Some Latinos Supported Proposition 187: Testing Economic Threat and Cultural Identity Hypotheses”. Social Science Quarterly, V.81-#1, pp. 180-193.

○ M. Hood and I. Morris (2000). “Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Racial/Ethnic Context and the Anglo Vote on Proposition 187”. Social Science Quarterly, V.81-#1, pp. 194-206.

○ Y.-T. Lee, V. Ottai, and I. Hussain (2001). “Attitudes toward ‘Illegal’ Immigration into the United States: California Proposition 187”. Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences; V.23-#4, pp. 430-443.

● Political economy of enforcement

■ W. Shughart, R. Tollison, and M. Kimenyi (1986). “The Political Economy of Immigration Restrictions”. Yale Journal of Regulation; V.4-#?, pp. 79-97.

○ Lowell, B. Lindsay; Frank D. Bean and R. O. Delagarza. 1986. “The Dilemmas of Undocumented Immigration: An Analysis of the 1984 Simpson-Mazzoli Vote.” Social Science Quarterly, 67(1), pp. 118-27.

■ A. Dávila, J. Pagán, and M. Grau (1999). “Immigration Reform, the INS, and the Distribution of Interior and Border Enforcement Resources”. Public Choice; V.99-#3/4, pp. 327-345.

■ G. Hanson and A. Spilimbergo (2001). “Political Economy, Sectoral Shocks, and Border Enforcement”. Canadian Journal of Economics; V.34-#3, pp. 612-638.

○ T. Dunn (1996). The Militarization of the U.S.-Mexico Border, 1978-1992: Low-Intensity Conflict Comes Home. Austin: University of Texas Press.

○ P. Andreas (2000). Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

● Political Economy of Trade v. Immigration

■ A.M. Mayda (2008). “Why are People More Pro-Trade than Pro-Migration?”. Economics Letters; V.101-#3, pp. 160-163.

■ Hatton, Timothy (2007). “A Dual Policy Paradox: Why have Trade and Immigration Policies always Differed in Labor Scarce Economies?” in T. J. Hatton, K. H. O’Rourke and A. M. Taylor (eds), The New Comparative Economic History: Essays in Honor of Jeffrey G. Williamson . Cambridge Mass: MIT Press.

■ Greenaway, David and Douglas Nelson (2010). “The Politics of (Anti-) Globalization: What Do We Learn from Simple Models?”. in N. Gaston and A. Khalid, eds. Globalization and Economic Integration: Winners and Losers in the Asia-Pacific. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, pp. 69-92.

■ Paola Conconi, Giovanni Facchini, Max Steinhardt, Maurizio Zanardi (2012). “The Political Economy of Trade and Migration: Evidence from the US Congress”. HWWI Research Paper, #136.

○ Peters, Margaret E. (2014). “Trade, Foreign Direct Investment, and Immigration Policy Making in the United States.” International Organization, V.68-#04, 811-44.

○ Schwellnus, Cyrille (2008). “The Non-Traded Sector, Lobbying, and the Choice between the Customs Union and the Common Market”. Economics and Politics, V.20-#3, pp. 361-90.

○ Facchini, Giovanni and Cecilia Testa (2009). “Who Is against a Common Market?”. Journal of the European Economic Association, V.7-#5, pp. 1068-100.

○ Burgoon, Brian. (2012). “Partisan Embedding of Liberalism: How Trade, Investment, and Immigration Affect Party Support for the Welfare State.” Comparative Political Studies, V.45-#5, 606-35.

○ Bougheas, Spiros and Douglas Nelson. (2013). “On the Political Economy of High Skilled Migration and International Trade.” European Economic Review, V.63-#0, 206-24.

Final Examination: Sunday, 17 December, 1:00pm.