Professor: Douglas Nelson
Office: Tilton 108 (Murphy Institute), Phone: 865-5317
Office Hours: Tuesday & Thursday, 3:30-5:30
Virtually all contemporary economies are characterized by extensive relations between the economic and political systems. All of the modern (post-) industrial political economies are capitalist democracies and (with appropriate adjustments for the European Union) they are all organized as nation states. In addition to these key building blocks, they are also characterized by extensive welfare states, relatively organized labor markets, and governments that take an active role in the management of the macroeconomy. It has been argued that these last three institutions play an essential role in supporting the first three. Furthermore, it has been argued that trends in globalization and post-modernization fatally undermine the second set of institutions. In this course, we examine these relationships and their dynamics.
PECN 3040 is one of the core courses in the political economy major. I will assume that you have had exposure to economic analysis at least at a level consistent with principles of microeconomics and macroeconomics. I will also assume that you are comfortable with algebra and geometry. Some of the readings and some of the lectures may make use of somewhat more advanced mathematics. I will not expect you to be able to reproduce such analysis on an exam, however I will expect you to make a good faith effort to understand what is being argued and to be able to express informally what the basic argument is, and how it fits into the broader goals of the course.
■This course introduces students to the comparative analysis of the interaction between economics and politics with particular application to the relatively wealthy, industrial/post-industrial countries.
■Students should be able to apply a variety of modern theoretical and empirical approaches to the analysis of core issues in the political economy of such countries. Specifically, students should understand that different countries seek solve problems related to macroeconomic management, employment, delivery of welfare in response to changes in the economic, political, technological and social environments. That they solve similar problems in quite distinctive ways, while remaining capitalist democracies.
■Students should be able to identify core controversies in the analysis of these issues and should develop theoretical frameworks, historical and quantitative data sufficient to support making well-grounded evaluations of those controversies.
There are no standard texts for a course like this, so the readings will be drawn from a variety of sources. These will be available either as linked from the syllabus or, for items that are not readily available online, on Canvas. We will, however, draw a number of readings from:
Beramendi, Häusermann, Kitschelt and Kriesi (2015). The Politics of Advanced Capitalism. New York: Cambridge University Press. [BHKK]
There is a substantial amount of reading, and everyone is responsible for completing the reading in a timely fashion (i.e. prior to it’s discussion in class). Do not try putting the reading off until just before class. The assigned readings create a foundation on which the lectures will build. The readings are not a substitute for the lectures, nor are the lectures a substitute for the assigned readings. You will be responsible for all readings and all lecture material on exams.
This course is primarily a lecture class. However, your understanding of both the assigned readings and the lectures will be enhanced through active participation in class discussion. Asking questions in class is a good way to clarify issues that were unclear in the assigned readings and/or in the lecture. In addition, given the constraints of online only presentation of the material, every student will be assigned to a tutorial section that will meet once every X weeks.
Evaluation: Your performance in this course will be evaluated on the basis of 2 examinations (worth 100 points each); and 4 reaction papers (worth 100 total points). To earn an A, you must earn at least 90 percent of the points available. To pass the course you must earn at least 60 percent of the points available. Grades between these limits will be determined on the basis of your performance relative to that of the class as a whole.
Examination format. The mid-term exam will have the following format: about 40% short answer questions and about 60% essays. The short answer questions seek to identify mastery of detailed knowledge of core concepts. The essay questions ask you to develop a coherent argument requiring you to deploy analytical techniques and specific knowledge developed in the course. In general there will be more questions of both types than must be answered, so you will have some choice (though there is often one mandatory question which everyone must answer). the Mid-term exam will be prepared in Canvas using the Lock-Down browser.
Policy on examinations. The midterm exam will be given in class on 11 March. Unless you have a standard university accepted excuse for missing the exam (e.g. health with standard university form), you must take the exams at their scheduled time. The final exam will be a take home essay that will be distributed after the last lecture and will be due on 10 May at 4:00pm (i.e. the scheduled time for the final exam).
Tutorials and tutorial papers papers. Every member of a specific tutorial will prepare a short (3-5 page) paper on some aspect of the material that will be covered in the class immediately following the date of your tutorial. These papers are “reaction papers”. A reaction paper is a short paper (3-5 pages) discussing some aspect of the relevant reading, it is not a book report. In the reaction paper you must explicitly discuss the relevant reading and evaluate some central aspect of its discussion. Note: “evaluate” means that you must identify some central aspect of the books analysis, explain why you think this aspect is interesting/important, and present your evaluation of the author’s position (note that you must make an argument, simply asserting your agreement or disagreement will not be sufficient for a passing grade). In addition to the reaction paper, you must also submit 5 questions that you think would be good topics for discussion in the tutorial. The reaction papers are due not later than 6:00pm the evening before we are scheduled to discuss a specific topic (see syllabus), late papers will not be accepted and will earn a grade of zero.
Honor code: All students are responsible for knowing and adhering to Tulane University’s Honor Code, available at http://www.tulane.edu/~jruscher/dept/Honor.Code.html .
Tulane University recognizes the inherent dignity of all individuals and promotes respect for all people.
As such, Tulane is committed to providing an environment free of all forms of discrimination including sexual and gender-based discrimination, harassment, and violence like sexual assault, intimate partner violence, and stalking. If you (or someone you know) has experienced or is experiencing these types of behaviors, know that you are not alone. Resources and support are available: you can learn more at allin.tulane.edu. Any and all of your communications on these matters will be treated as either “Confidential” or “Private” as explained in the chart below. Please know that if you choose to confide in me I am mandated by the university to report to the Title IX Coordinator, as Tulane and I want to be sure you are connected with all the support the university can offer. You do not need to respond to outreach from the university if you do not want. You can also make a report yourself, including an anonymous report, through the form at tulane.edu/concerns.
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Tulane University strives to make all learning experiences as accessible as possible. If you anticipate or experience academic barriers based on your disability, please let me know immediately so that we can privately discuss options. I will never ask for medical documentation from you to support potential accommodation needs. Instead, to establish reasonable accommodations, I may request that you register with the Goldman Center for Student Accessibility. After registration, make arrangements with me as soon as possible to discuss your accommodations so that they may be implemented in a timely fashion. Goldman Center contact information: email@example.com; (504) 862-8433; accessibility.tulane.edu.
Code of Academic Conduct
The Code of Academic Conduct applies to all undergraduate students, full-time and part-time, in Tulane University. Tulane University expects and requires behavior compatible with its high standards of scholarship. By accepting admission to the university, a student accepts its regulations (i.e., Code of Academic Conduct and Code of Student Conduct) and acknowledges the right of the university to take disciplinary action, including suspension or expulsion, for conduct judged unsatisfactory or disruptive.
Religious Accommodation Policy
Per Tulane’s religious accommodation policy (with hyperlink), I will make every reasonable effort to ensure that students are able to observe religious holidays without jeopardizing their ability to fulfill their academic obligations. Excused absences do not relieve the student from the responsibility for any course work required during the period of absence. Students should notify me within the first two weeks of the semester about their intent to observe any holidays that fall on a class day or on the day of the final exam.
I am aware that Tulane students are able to read a standard university syllabus and determine the content of the course and its relation to the major and the individual student’s course of study. However, the administration of Tulane University, along with the Southern Association of Colleges and Schools (SACS–which “accredits” primary and secondary schools as well as all varieties of 2 and 4 year undergraduate programs [with very little in the way of adjustment in rubrics, metrics, etc.]), has determined that you require additional information. I collect this material in a separate section so that you can refer to it, or discard it, as you consider appropriate.
STUDENT OBJECTIVES/OUTCOMES: By the end of the course, the student should be able to think, speak, and write fluently and competently about the ideas and issues covered in the course (as reflected in the course description and the syllabus). The student should have a solid understanding of the social, political, economic, and philosophical significance of ideas and concepts in the analysis of modern democratic, capitalist political economies and they should be familiar with major ideas and theories regarding explanations, interpretations, applications, and criticisms of work on democratic, capitalist political economies. The student should be able to formulate critical views concerning these issues and respond fluently and competently to questions concerning these views.
1. Students will be able to identify and recognize major themes, ideas, and concepts.
2. Students will analyze, interpret, and discuss these ideas in a scholarly and coherent manner.
3. Students will construct, formulate, and develop creative and critical scholarly assessments.
4. Students will appraise, evaluate, and appreciate the values and consequences of these ideas.
● 1/19, Course Introduction: Globalization and Comparative PE
Topic I. The Modern Political Economy: industrial capitalism, nation state, and liberal democracy
● 1/21, The Modern (Nation) State
■ Held (1995). “The Development of the Modern State”. In S. Hall and B. Gieben, Modernity: An Introduction to Modern Societies. Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 55-89. [Canvas]
■ Mann (1988). “The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results”. In States, War, and Capitalism. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 109-136.
● 1/26, Capitalist Economies
■ Collins (1980). “Weber’s Last Theory of Capitalism: A Systematization”. American Sociological Review; V.45-#6, pp. 925-942.
■ Polanyi (1944). “The Self-Regulating Market and Fictitious Commodities: Labor, Land and Money”. Chapter 6 of The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press, pp. 71-80. [Canvas]
○ Greif (2008). “Commitment, Coercion and Markets: The Nature and Dynamics of Institutions Supporting Exchange”. In Ménard and Shirley (Eds.). Handbook of New Institutional Economics. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, pp. 727-785.
● 1/28, Democracy & Civil Society
■ Kriesi 2013. “Democratic legitimacy: Is there a legitimacy crisis in contemporary politics?“. Politische Vierteljahresschrift 54-#4:609-638.
■ Chambers and Kopstein (2006). “Civil Society and the State,” in Dryzek, Honig and Phillips eds, The Oxford Handbook of Political Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 363-81.[Canvas]
○ Kriesi (2013). “Democracy as a Moving Target,” in Kriesi, Lavenex, Esser, Matthes, Bühlmann and Bochsler eds, Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 19-43.
○ Bühlmann and Kriesi (2013). “Models for Democracy,” in Kriesi, Lavenex, Esser, Matthes, Bühlmann and Bochsler eds, Democracy in the Age of Globalization and Mediatization. London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 44-68.
○ Walzer (1991). “The Better Vision. The Idea of Civil Society, a Path to Social Reconstruction.” Dissent, Spring, 293-304. [Canvas]
○ Chambers, Simone and Jeffrey Kopstein (2001). “Bad Civil Society.” Political Theory, V.29-#6, 837-65.
○ Alexander (1997). “The Paradoxes of Civil Society.” International Sociology, V.12-#2, 115-33.
○ Przeworski and Limongi (1997). “Modernization: Theories and Facts”. World Politics; V.49-#1, pp. 155-183.
○ Boix and Stokes (2003). “Endogenous Democratization”. World Politics; V.55-#4, pp. 517-549.
○ Huber, Rueschemeyer, and Stephens (2003). “The Impact of Economic Development on Democracy”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; V.7-#3, pp. 71-86.
● 2/2, Crisis in Capitalist Democracy
■ Polanyi (1944). “Man, Nature, and Productive Organization”. Chapter 11 of The Great Transformation. Boston: Beacon Press, pp. 130-134. [Canvas]
■ Iversen (2006). “Capitalism and Democracy”. Chapter 33 in B. Weingast and D. Wittman, eds. Oxford Handbook of Political Economy. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 601-623.
○ Schumpeter (1942/1975). “Can Capitalism Survive”, Part II or Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York: Harper & Row, pp. 59-163.
○ Habermas (1975). Legitimation Crisis. Boston: Beacon Press.
Topic II. Embedded Liberalism and Its Varieties
● 2/4, Globalization
■ Baldwin (2006). “Globalisation: The Great Unbundling(s)“. ms. esp. pp. 7-21.
○ O’Rourke and Williamson (2002). “When Did Globalisation Begin?” European Review of Economic History, V.6-#1, 23-50.
● 2/9, Basics of Embedded Liberalism, Domestic and Global
■ Shonfield (1965). “The Argument in Brief”. Chapter IV in Modern Capitalism. London: Oxford University Press, pp. 61-67. [Canvas]
■ Ruggie (1982). “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Post-War Economic Order.” International Organization, V.36-#2, 379-415.
○ Marshall (1963). “Citizenship and social class”, Sociology at the Crossroads, pp. 67-127, London: Heinemann.
○ Boix (2015). “Prosperity and the Evolving Structure of Advanced Economies”. BHKK, Chapter 2.
● 2/11-2/18, Varieties of Capitalism: Frameworks for Analysis
■ Hall and Soskice (2001). “An Introduction to Varieties of Capitalism,” in P. A. Hall and D. W. Soskice eds, Varieties of Capitalism: The Institutional Foundations of Comparative Advantage. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1-68.
■ Bradley, Huber, Moller, Nielsen and Stephens (2003). “Distribution and Redistribution in Postindustrial Democracies.” World Politics, V.55-#2, 193-228.
2/15-2/16: Mardi Gras break, no classes
●2/23, Macroeconomics of Embedded Liberalism, 1: Macroeconomic Policy
■ Blinder (1987). Chapters 2 & 3 from Hard Heads, Soft Hearts: Tough-Minded Economics for a Just Society. Reading: Addison-Wesley, pp. 32-108. [Canvas]
○ Iversen and Soskice (2006). “New Macroeconomics and Political Science”. Annual Review of Political Science, V.9, pp. 429-453.
● 2/25, Macroeconomics of Embedded Liberalism, 2: Redistributive Policy
■ Bradley, Huber, Moller, Nielsen, and Stephens (2003). “Distribution and Redistribution in Post-Industrial Democracies”. World Politics; V.55-#2, pp. 193-228.
■ Iversen and Soskice (2006). “Electoral Institutions and the Politics of Coalitions: Why Some Democracies Redistribute More than Others”. American Political Science Review;. V.11-#2, pp. 165-181.
● 3/2, Microeconomics of Embedded Liberalism: Regulation
■ Kovacic and Shapiro (2000). “Antitrust Policy: A Century of Economic and Legal Thinking.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.14-#1, 43-60.
■ Lamoreaux, Naomi R. (2019). “The Problem of Bigness: From Standard Oil to Google.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.33-#3, 94-117.
○ Wood and Anderson (1993). “The Politics of U.S. Antitrust Regulation.” American Journal of Political Science, V.37-#1, pp. 2-39.
○ Hovenkamp, Herbert (2005). The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
● 3/4, Factor Markets under Embedded Liberalism, 1: Labor Markets and Income Distribution
■ Freeman and Medoff (1979). “The Two Faces of Unionism”. Public Interest; #57, pp. 69-93.
■ Rueda and Pontusson (2000). “Wage Inequality and Varieties of Capitalism.” World Politics, V.52-#3, 350-83.
○ Fortin and Lemieux (1997). “Institutional Changes and Rising Wage Inequality: Is There a Linkage?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.11-#2, 75-96.
○ Card, Lemieux and Riddell (2004). “Unions and Wage Inequality.” Journal of Labor Research, V.25-#4, 519-62.
○ Western and Rosenfeld (2011). “Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality.” American Sociological Review, V.76-#4, 513-37.
○ Nickell, Nunziata and Ochel (2004). “Unemployment in the OECD Since the 1960s. What Do We Know?”. Economic Journal; V.115-#500, pp. 1-27.
○ Calmfors and Driffill (1988). “Bargaining Structure, Corporatism and Economic Performance”. Economic Policy; #6, pp. 14-61.
● 3/9, Factor Markets under Embedded Liberalism, 2: Corporate Governance
■ Gourevitch (2003). “The politics of corporate governance regulation”. Yale Law Journal, V.112-#7, pp. 1829-1880.
○ Rajan and Zingales (2003). “The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the Twentieth Century”. Journal of Financial Economics; V.69-#1, pp. 5-50.
○ Roe (2006). “Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets.” Harvard Law Review, V.120-#2, 460-527.
○ Allen and Gale (2000). “Corporate Governance and Competition,” in X. Vives ed Corporate Governance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 23-84.
○ La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer. (1999). “Corporate Ownership around the World.” Journal of Finance, V.54-#2, 471-517.
○ Hansmann and Kraakman. (2001). “The End of History for Corporate Law.” Georgetown Law Journal, V.89-#2, 439-68.
○ Milhaupt and Pistor (2008). Law and Capitalism: What Corporate Crises Reveal About Legal Systems and Economic Development around the World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
○ Bloom and Van Reenen. (2010). “Why Do Management Practices Differ across Firms and Countries?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.24-#1, 203-24.
Midterm Exam, 3/11
Topic III. New Globalization, Post-Industrialization and Transformation
● 3/16 – 3/18: The New Globalization: Money & Finance
■ Obstfeld and Taylor (2017). “International Monetary Relations: Taking Finance Seriously.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.31-#3, 3-28.
■ Frieden (2016). “The Governance of International Finance.” Annual Review of Political Science, V.19-#1, 33-48.
■ Philippon and Reshef. (2013). “An International Look at the Growth of Modern Finance.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.27-#2, 73-96.
■ Rodrik (2011). “The Political Trilemma of the World Economy”. Chapter 9 of The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy. New York: W. W. Norton & Co., pp. 184-206. [Canvas]
○ Garrett (1998). “Global Markets and National Politics: Collision Course or Virtuous Circle?”. International Organization; V.52-#4, pp. 787-824.
○ Obstfeld (1998). “The Global Capital Market: Benefactor or Menace?”. Journal of Economic Perspectives; V.12-#4, pp. 9-30.
○ Obstfeld and Taylor (2003). “Globalization and Capital Markets,” in M. D. Bordo, A. M. Taylor and J. G. Williamson eds, Globalization in Historical Perspective. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 121-88.
○ Obstfeld (2013). “The International Monetary System: Living with Asymmetry,” in R. C. Feenstra and A. M. Taylor eds, Globalization in an Age of Crisis: Multilateral Economic Cooperation in the Twenty-First Century. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 301-36.
○ Obstfeld (2015). “Trilemmas and Tradeoffs: Living with Financial Globalization,” in Raddatz, Saravia and Ventura eds, Global Liquidity, Spillovers to Emerging Markets and Policy Responses. Santiago, Chile: Central Bank of Chile, 13-78.
○ Rodrik and Subramanian (2009). “Why Did Financial Globalization Disappoint?” IMF Staff Papers, V.56-#1, 112-38.
○ Mishkin (2009). “Globalization, Macroeconomic Performance, and Monetary Policy.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, V.41, 187-96.
○ Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei. (2009). “Financial Globalization: A Reappraisal.” IMF Staff Papers, V.56-#1, 8-62.
○ Kose, Prasad, Rogoff and Wei (2010). “Financial Globalization and Economic Policies,” in D. Rodrik and M. Rosenzweig eds, Handbook of Development Economics. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 4283-359.
○ Singer (2004). “Capital Rules: The Domestic Politics of International Regulatory Harmonization.” International Organization, V.58-#3, 531-65.
○ Krippner (2005). “The Financialization of the American Economy.” Socio-Economic Review, V.3-#2, 173-208.
○ Rajan (2006). “Has Finance Made the World Riskier?” European Financial Management, V.12-#4, 499-533.
○ Tomaskovic-Devey and Lin. (2013). “Financialization: Causes, Inequality Consequences, and Policy Implications.” NC Banking Inst., V.18-#1, 167-94.
○ Igan and Mishra (2014). “Wall Street, Capitol Hill, and K Street: Political Influence and Financial Regulation.” The Journal of Law & Economics, V.57-#4, 1063-84.
○ Kroszner and Strahan (2014). “Regulation and Deregulation of the U.S. Banking Industry: Causes, Consequences and Implications for the Future,” in N. L. Rose ed Economic Regulation and Its Reform: What Have We Learned? Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 485-543.
○ Huber, Petrova and Stephens (2020). “Financialization, Labor Market Institutions and Inequality.” Review of International Political Economy, 1-28.
● 3/23: The New Globalization: Trade & Global Production
■ Baldwin (2006). “Globalisation: The Great Unbundling(s)“. ms. esp. pp. 22-46.
■ Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott (2007): “Firms in International Trade”. The Journal of Economics Perspectives; V.21-#3, pp. 105-130.
○ Baldwin (2013). “Trade and Industrialisation after Globalisation’s Second Unbundling: How Building and Joining a Supply Chain Are Different and Why It Matters,” in R. C. Feenstra and A. M. Taylor eds, Globalization in an Age of Crisis: Multilateral Economic Cooperation in the Twenty-First. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 165-212.
○ Bordo, Eichengreen and Irwin (1999). “Is Globalization Today Really Different from 100 Years Ago?,” in R. Lawrence and S. Collins eds, Brookings Trade Forum–1999. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1-71.
○ Baldwin and Martin (1999). “Two Waves of Globalisation: Superficial Similarities, Fundamental Differences,” in H. Siebert ed Globalisation and Labour. Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr for Kiel Institute of World Economics, 3-59.
● 3/25: Labor Market Effects and the Political Economy of Trade & Global Production
■ Autor (2018). “Trade and Labor Markets: Lessons from China’s Rise“. IZA World of Labor; 2018: 431.
■ Fort, Pierce and Schott (2018). “New Perspectives on the Decline of US Manufacturing Employment.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.32-#2, 47-72.
○ Slaughter (2000). “What Are the Results of Product-Price Studies and What Can We Learn from Their Differences?,” in R. C. Feenstra ed The Impact of International Trade on Wages. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 129-69.
○ Haskel, Lawrence, Leamer and Slaughter. (2012). “Globalization and U.S. Wages: Modifying Classic Theory to Explain Recent Facts.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.26-#2, 119-40.
○ Ebenstein, Harrison, McMillan and Phillips. (2013). “Estimating the Impact of Trade and Offshoring on American Workers Using the Current Population Surveys.” Review of Economics and Statistics, V.96-#4, 581-95.
○ Hummels, Jørgensen, Munch and Xiang. (2014). “The Wage Effects of Offshoring: Evidence from Danish Matched Worker-Firm Data.” American Economic Review, V.104-#6, 1597-629.
○ Autor, Dorn and Hanson. (2015). “Untangling Trade and Technology: Evidence from Local Labour Markets.” The Economic Journal, V.125-#584, 621-46.
○ Ruggie (1995). “At Home Abroad, Abroad at Home: International Liberalisation and Domestic Stability in the New World Economy.” Millennium, V.24-#3, 507-26.
○ Putnam (1988). “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games.” International Organization, V.42-#3, 427-60.
○ Bailey, Goldstein and Weingast. (1997). “The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade.” World Politics, V.49-#3, 309-38.
○ Hiscox (2006). “Through a Glass Darkly: Framing Effects and Individuals’ Attitudes toward Trade.” International Organization, V.60-#3, 755-80.
○ Sattler and Urpelainen. (2012). “Explaining Public Support for International Integration: How Do National Conditions and Treaty Characteristics Interact with Individual Beliefs?” The Journal of Politics, V.74-#4, 1108-24.
● 3/30: The New Globalization: Migration
■ Gaston and Nelson (2000). “Immigration and Labour Market Outcomes in the United States: A Political-Economy Puzzle.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, V.16-#3, 104-14.
■ Burgoon (2014). “Immigration, Integration, and Support for Redistribution in Europe.” World Politics, V.66-#03, 365-405.
■ Dancygier & Walter (2015). “Globalization, Labor Market Risks, and Class Cleavages”. Chapter 5 in BHKK.
○ Shayo (2009). “A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation, Class, and Redistribution.” American Political Science Review, V.103-#2, 147-74.
○ Portes and Vickstrom. (2011). “Diversity, Social Capital, and Cohesion.” Annual Review of Sociology, V.37-#1, 461-79.
○ Dustmann, Fabbri and Preston (2011). “Racial Harassment, Ethnic Concentration, and Economic Conditions.” The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, V.113-#3, 689-711.
○ Lipsmeyer and Zhu (2011). “Immigration, Globalization, and Unemployment Benefits in Developed EU States.” American Journal of Political Science, V.55-#3, 647-64.
○ Jeong, Miller, Schofield and Sened. (2011). “Cracks in the Opposition: Immigration as a Wedge Issue for the Reagan Coalition.” American Journal of Political Science, V.55-#3, 511-25.
○ Dahlberg, Edmark, Lundqvist (2012). “Ethnic Diversity and Preferences for Redistribution.” Journal of Political Economy, V.120-#1, 41-76.
○ Ottaviano, Peri and Wright. (2013). “Immigration, Offshoring, and American Jobs.” American Economic Review, V.103-#5, 1925-59.
○ Gaston and Nelson. (2013). “Bridging Trade Theory and Labour Econometrics: The Effects of International Migration.” Journal of Economic Surveys, V.27-#1, 98-139.
● 4/01: The Economics of Post-Modernization: Robots, AI, and Machine Learning
■ Freeman (2015). “Who Owns the Robots Rules the World“. IZA World of Labor; 2015-5.
■ Frey and Osborne (2017). “The future of employment: How susceptible are jobs to computerisation?“. Technological Forecasting and Social Change V.114, 254-280.
■ Autor (2015). “Why Are There Still So Many Jobs? The History and Future of Workplace Automation.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.29-#3, 3-30.
○ Acemoglu & Restrepo (2019). “Automation and New Tasks: How Technology Displaces and Reinstates Labor.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.33-#2, read only 3-13.
○ Mokyr, Vickers and Ziebarth (2015). “The History of Technological Anxiety and the Future of Economic Growth: Is This Time Different?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.29-#3, 31-50.
○ Ibsen and Thelen (2017). “Diverging Solidarity: Labor Strategies in the New Knowledge Economy.” World Politics, V.69-#3, 409-47.
○ Levy (2018). “Computers and Populism: Artificial Intelligence, Jobs, and Politics in the near Term.” Oxford Review of Economic Policy, V.34-#3, 393-417.
○ Hope and Martelli (2019). “The Transition to the Knowledge Economy, Labor Market Institutions, and Income Inequality in Advanced Democracies.” World Politics, V.71-#2, 236-88.
● 4/06: Globalization, Post-Modernization & Labor Markets
■ Autor (2014). “Skills, Education, and the Rise of Earnings Inequality among the “Other 99 Percent”.” Science, V.344-#6186, 843-51.
■ Oesch (2015). “Occupational Structure and Labor Market Change in Western Europe since 1990”. Chapter 4 in BHKK.
■ Hassel (2015). “Trade Unions and the Future of Democratic Capitalism”. Chapter 9 in BHKK.
○ Autor, Katz and Kearney. (2008). “Trends in U.S. Wage Inequality: Revising the Revisionists.” Review of Economics and Statistics, V.90-#2, 300-23.
○ Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty and Saez (2013). “The Top 1 Percent in International and Historical Perspective.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.27-#3, 3-20.
○ Saez and Zucman (2020). “The Rise of Income and Wealth Inequality in America: Evidence from Distributional Macroeconomic Accounts.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.34-#4, 3-26.
○ Kopczuk and Zwick (2020). “Business Incomes at the Top.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.34-#4, 27-51.
○ Hoffmann, Lee and Lemieux (2020). “Growing Income Inequality in the United States and Other Advanced Economies.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.34-#4, 52-78.
○ Klausen (1999). “The Declining Significance of Male Workers: Trade-Union Responses to Changing Labor Markets,” in H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks and J. D. Stephens eds, Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 194-230.
○ Esping-Andersen (1999). “Politics without Class: Postindustrial Cleavages in Europe and America,” in H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks and J. D. Stephens eds, Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 293-316.
○ Wallerstein and Western. (2000). “Unions in Decline? What Has Changed and Why.” Annual Review of Political Science, V.3, 355-77.
○ Scruggs and Lange. (2002). “Where Have All the Members Gone? Globalization, Institutions, and Union Density.” The Journal of Politics, V.64-#1, 126-53.
○ Ebbinghaus (2002). “Globalization and Trade Unions: A Comparative-Historical Examination of the Convergence Thesis”. Économie appliquée, V55-#2, pp. 121-139.
○ Raess and Burgoon. (2006). “The Dogs That Sometimes Bark: Globalization and Works Council Bargaining in Germany.” European Journal of Industrial Relations, V.12-#3, 287-309.
○ Baccaro and Rei (2007). “Institutional Determinants of Unemployment in OECD Countries: Does the Deregulatory View Hold Water?” International Organization, V.61-#3, 527-69.
○ Rueda, Wibbels & Altamirano (2015). “The Origins of Dualism”. Chapter 3 in BHKK.
4/8: Lagniappe day, no class
● 4/13: Globalization, Post-Modernization and Redistributive Policy
■ Huber & Stephens (2015). “Post-Industrial Social Policy”.Chapater 10 in BHKK.
■ Gingrich & Ansell (2015). “The Dynamics of Social Investment”. Chapter 11 in BHKK.
■ Moriconi, Peri and Turati (2019). “Immigration and Voting for Redistribution: Evidence from European Elections.” Labour Economics, V.61, 101765.
○ Bradley, Huber, Moller, Nielsen, and Stephens (2003). “Distribution and Redistribution in Post-Industrial Democracies”. World Politics; V.55-#2, pp. 193-228.
○ Steinmo (1994). “The End of Redistribution? International Pressures and Domestic Tax Policy Choices”. Challenge; V.37-#6, pp. 9-18.
○ Garrett (2001). “Globalization and Government Spending Around the World”. Studies in Comparative International Development; V.35-#4, pp. 3-29.
○ Hays (2003). “Globalization and Capital Taxation in Consensus and Majoritarian Democracies.” World Politics, V.56-#1, 79-113.
○ Stewart and Webb (2006). “International Competition in Corporate Taxation: Evidence from the OECD Time Series”. Economic Policy; V.21-#45, pp. 153-201.
○ Walter (2010). “Globalization and the Welfare State: Testing the Microfoundations of the Compensation Hypothesis”. International Studies Quarterly, V.54-#2, pp. 403-26.
○ Burgoon (2013). “Inequality and Anti-Globalization Backlash by Political Parties.” European Union Politics, V.14-#3, 408-35.
○ Genschel and Schwarz (2011). “Tax Competition: A Literature Review.” Socio-Economic Review, V.9-#2, 339-70.
○ Piketty and Saez. (2007). “How Progressive Is the U.S. Federal Tax System? A Historical and International Perspective.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.21-#1, 3-24.
○ Kleven, Henrik Jacobsen. (2014). “How Can Scandinavians Tax So Much?” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.28-#4, 77-98.
○ Zucman, Gabriel. (2014). “Taxing across Borders: Tracking Personal Wealth and Corporate Profits.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, V.28-#4, 121-48.
○ Egger, Nigai and Strecker (2019). “The Taxing Deed of Globalization.” American Economic Review, V.109-#2, 353-90.
● 4/15: The Political-Economy of Post-Modernization: Anti-Global Populism
■ Inglehart and Norris (2017). “Trump and the Populist Authoritarian Parties: The Silent Revolution in Reverse.” Perspectives on Politics, V.15-#2, 443-54.
■ Rodrik (2018). “Populism and the Economics of Globalization”. Journal of International Business Policy, V.1-#1/2, pp. 12-33. [Canvas]
■ Hoekman & Nelson (2018). “Reflecting on Populism and the Economics of Globalization”. Journal of International Business Policy, V.1-#1/2, pp. 34-43. [Canvas]
○ Broz, Frieden and Weymouth (forthcoming). “Populism in Place: The Economic Geography of the Globalization Backlash.” International Organization, 1-31.
○ Frieden (2019). “The Political Economy of the Globalization Backlash: Sources and Implications,” in Catão and Obstfeld eds, Meeting Globalization’s Challenges: Policies to Make Trade Work for All. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press/The International Monetary Fund, 181-96.
● 4/20: The Political Economy of Post-Modernization: Gender, Family, etc.
■ Esping-Anderson (2015) “The Return of the Family”. Chapter 6 in BHKK.
■ Iversen and Rosenbluth (2006). “The Political Economy of Gender: Explaining Cross-National Variation in the Gender Division of Labor and the Gender Voting Gap”. American Journal of Political Science; V.50-#1, pp. 1-19.
○ Estevez-Abe (2006). “Gendering the Varieties of Capitalism: A Study of Occupational Segregation by Sex in Advanced Industrial Societies”. World Politics; V.59-#1, pp. 142-175.
○ Huber and Stephens (2000). “Partisan Governance, Women’s Employment and the Social Democratic Welfare State”. American Sociological Review; V.65-#3, pp. 323-342.
● 4/22-4/27: The Political-Economy of Post-Modernization: Preferences & Parties
■ Kitschelt and Rehm (2015). “Party Alignments: Change and Continuity”. Chapter 7 in BHKK.
■ Häusermann and Kriesi (2015). “What Do Voters Want? Dimensions and Configurations in Individual-Level Preferences and Party Choice”. Chapter 8 in BHKK.
○ Kitschelt (1999). “European Social Democracy between Political Economy and Electoral Competition,” in H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks and J. D. Stephens eds, Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 317-45.
○ Van Kersbergen, Kees (1999). “Contemporary Christian Democracy and the Demise of the Politics of Mediation,” in H. Kitschelt, P. Lange, G. Marks and J. D. Stephens eds, Continuity and Change in Contemporary Capitalism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 346-70.
○ Burgoon and Dekker. (2010). “Flexible Employment, Economic Insecurity and Social Policy Preferences in Europe.” Journal of European Social Policy, V.20-#2, 126-41.
○ Burgoon (2012). “Partisan Embedding of Liberalism: How Trade, Investment, and Immigration Affect Party Support for the Welfare State.” Comparative Political Studies, V.45-#5, 606-35.
● 4/29: Convergence?: The End of the Golden Age Structures?
■ Jackson & Thelen (2015). “Stability and Change in CMEs: Corporate Governance and Industrial Relations in Germany and Denmark”. Chapter 12 in BHKK.
■ Beramendi (2015). “Constrained Partisanship and Economic Outcomes”. Chapter 13 in BHKK.
○ Ponstusson and Swenson (1996). “Labor Markets, Production Strategies and Wage-bargaining Institutions: The Swedish Employer Offensive in Comparative Perspective”. Comparative Political Studies; V.29-#2, pp. 223-250. [Revised version in Iversen, Pontusson and Soskice, eds., Unions, Employers and Central banks, 75-106.]
○ Huber and Stephens (2002). “Globalisation, Competitiveness, and the Social Democratic Model”. Social Policy and Society; V.1-#1, pp. 47-57.
○ Steinmo (2003). “Bucking the Trend: Swedish Social Democracy in a Global Economy”. New Political Economy, V.8-#1, pp. 31- 48.
○ Streeck and Trampusch (2006). “Economic Reform and the Political Economy of the German Welfare State”. in Dyson and Padgett (eds.). The Politics of Economic Reform in Germany. London and New York: Routledge. pp. 60-81.
Final Exam: Monday, 10 May, 4:00-7:00pm